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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Presentation 
On April 9, 1940 Germany invaded Norway and Denmark. For the next five years the German 
occupational force would try to transform the Norwegian society, including the University of 
Oslo, to better fit the Nazi ideology.
1
 The unwillingness of its students and professors to 
surrender to the demands of the occupation soon led the university into a protracted conflict 
with Nasjonal Samling and the German occupational force. The first conflict concerned the 
occupational force’s dissolution of Det norske Studentersamfund (the student union) in 
September 1940. The second conflict occurred when the occupational force arrested Rector 
Didrik Arup Seip in September 1941. A third conflict occurred when the students protested 
against NS’s labour mobilisation in February 1943. The fourth conflict began with a letter of 
protest from the professors against NS’s interference with the university’s admission 
procedures. It all ended on November 30, 1943 when the German occupational force closed 
the University of Oslo and arrested its professors and students. These conflicts will 
throughout the thesis be referred to as «events» at the University of Oslo.  
The conflicts at the University of Oslo did not go unnoticed in Sweden; In fact, there 
was a reaction from Sweden to each conflict at the university during the war. This thesis will 
focus on the reactions of six Swedish newspapers; the daily newspapers Dagens Nyheter, 
Arbetet, Göteborgs Handels– och Sjöfartstidning, as well as the student newspapers 
Gaudeamus, Ergo and Lundagård.
 2
 These newspapers would in many cases be the opposition 
to the Swedish government’s policies to keep Sweden out of the war. This opposition was 
influenced both by the Nordic Idea, and by the changing relationships of the Swedish 
government with the German government in Berlin and the Norwegian exile government in 
London.  
                                                 
1
 Note: JosephTerboven was appointed Reich Commissar  of occupied Norway on April 24, 1940. Terboven was 
to have the executive power, but Berlin intended that a council of Norwegians, “Administrasjonrådet”, would 
deal with the day- to- day governance of Norway. Terboven did not succeed in cooperating with 
Administrasjonsrådet, and on September 25 1940 he appointed a Commissariat Council consisting both of 
members from Nasjonal Samling (NS) and others (Vidkun Quisling was left out). NS was made the only legal 
political party. This was the starting point of Nyordning (New Arrangment), an attempt to arrange the 
Norwegian society in accordance with German ideology. From December 1940, the Führerprinzip was 
introduced in all Norwegian municipalities and counties, with a Mayor elected by the Commissariat Council. 
Terboven wanted to apply this new arrangement to the University of Oslo. Berti Nøkleby, Josef Terboven: 
Hitlers mann i Norge, (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2008), 160.  
2
 Note: The student newspapers come from Uppsala University(Ergo), Lund University (Lundagård) and 
Stockholm University College (Gaudeamus). The translation of the names of the daily newspapers: Arbetet – 
Work, Dagens Nyheter – Daily News, and Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning – Gothenburg Trade and 
Maritime Journal. This thesis will use the actual names of the newspapers and not the translations.  
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The Nordic Idea was rooted in the emergence of Scandinavism in the 1830s.
3
 This 
idea was based on the notion that the Scandinavian countries were «brothers», in the sense 
that they shared a common history, culture and language. This idea was very much present in 
the Sweden of the Second World War, and especially amongst its students. Therefore, the 
Nordic Idea that is used in this thesis is representative only for Sweden, and not all of the 
Nordic countries, i.e. Norway, Denmark and Finland. 
 
1.1.1 Main questions  
This thesis has two main questions, though some of the answers given to one question will 
also apply to the other. The reason for division of the subject into two questions was the 
desire to draw sufficient attention to both aspects. The first question is: Regarding the events 
at the University of Oslo during the Second World War, was there a difference between the 
reactions of the Swedish student newspapers and the reactions of the Swedish daily 
newspapers? How did they word their reactions and protests?  The second is: What 
determined whether the newspapers reacted to the events at the University of Oslo or not? Is it 
possible to argue that the relations of the Swedish government with Berlin and the Norwegian 
exile government influenced these reactions? Were the reactions and protest influenced by the 
Nordic Idea? Were there differences and similarities between the student newspapers and the 
daily newspapers? 
 
1.1.2 Delineation  
The subject of this thesis is the Swedish reactions to conflicts at the University of Oslo during 
the Second World War. This makes the Second World War the main historical area for the 
thesis, and more specifically that of the Nordic countries during the war. The subject also falls 
under the studies of university history, and, as the analysis will look at the reactions from 
Swedish newspapers, it is linked to media studies.    
This thesis has been divided up chronologically; it follows the events at the University 
of Oslo and the Swedish reactions to them between September 1940 and December 1943. 
September 1940 was chosen as the starting point as this was the month when the University of 
Oslo was deprived of its Student Union (hereafter known as DNS). The Swedish student 
newspapers considered this event the start of the conflict between the University of Oslo and 
the new regime in Norway. Chronologically, the thesis ends with the closure of the University 
                                                 
3
 The Nordic Idea will be examined in Chapter 2, subchapter 2.1.  
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of Oslo on November 30, 1943 and the Swedish reactions through December 1943.
4
 To 
understand the lack of reaction from the Swedish students in February 1943 and September 
1943, two additional events had to be included: a protest over a conflict between NS and the 
Norwegian clergy and teachers in May 1942 and the influx of Danish students to Sweden in 
October 1943.
5
 It has to be kept in mind that this is the only mentioning of the Danish 
students in this thesis, since this thesis’ purpose is to look at the relations between Sweden 
and Norway.  
The sources of this thesis have not been delineated geographically, but after their 
cultural and political position in the Swedish society during the war. More information on the 
sources will be given in subchapters 1.3.3 and 1.3.4, but a short introduction will be given 
here. The student newspapers from Uppsala University and Lund University were chosen 
because these are the oldest and most distinguished universities in Sweden. The student 
newspaper from Stockholm University College was chosen because it was positioned in the 
capital Stockholm. Each daily newspaper was chosen because of its political stance towards 
the war. Dagens Nyheter and Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning were both politically 
independent, but differed in their views: GHT criticised the Swedish government’s policies 
from the start of the war, whereas Dagens Nyheter only started criticising the government 
from 1942/1943. Arbetet had close ties with the Social Democrats, the political party that 
made up the government majority.  
When discussing the Swedish student newspapers, it is important to understand that 
this thesis has not tried to establish the political stance of the university administrations 
towards the events at the University of Oslo. The thesis uses the term «Swedish students» or 
«Swedish student newspapers» as an umbrella term for the student newspapers used in the 
thesis, and not every student newspaper in Sweden. If another educational institution is being 
used, this will be mentioned. It will be used in this way: «why did the Swedish students not 
react to the events?». Still, it should be stressed that not all students shared the views 
expressed in the articles in of the student newspapers, as many students were politically 
indifferent to the events of the war. The term has been used simply because it would serve no 
purpose to name every student who wrote about the events in Oslo and about the Nordic Idea, 
nor would it be possible or desirable.     
                                                 
4
 Several events at the University of Oslo have been left out of this thesis, simply because the Swedish students 
newspapers and daily newspapers did not react to them.  
5
 These events will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 4.  
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This thesis will examine how the relations of the Swedish government with Berlin and 
the Norwegian exile government affected the reactions of the Swedish student newspapers 
and daily newspapers towards the violations at the University of Oslo. In this regard, it must 
be mentioned that the term «Norwegian government» in this thesis is used exclusively about 
the Norwegian exile government in London. During the German invasion the Norwegian 
government with the king to London, where they stayed until the end of the war. The terms 
«The German government» and «Berlin» refer to the German government in Berlin, while the 
German government in Oslo is referred to as «The German occupational force» or «The Reich 
Commissariat». NS will be used to reference both the political party NS and the Commissariat 
Council Terboven established in September 1940 and eventually from February 1942, the 
government under the leadership of Vidkun Quisling.    
 The reason for looking into the Swedish government’s relations with the Norwegian 
and German governments is because of Sweden’s precarious position after the invasion of 
Norway and Denmark on April 9, 1940. Germany now posed a threat to Sweden’s 
independence and integrity. In reality, the Germans wished for Sweden to stay out of the war, 
as it had no strategic position towards either the Soviet Union or Great Britain.
6
 Still, the 
threat posed by Germany made the Swedish government adopt a submissive attitude towards 
Berlin, a choice that strained the relationship with the Norwegian exile government. Not all 
nuances of the relationships between the governments will be examined; the point of 
including them is simply to better understand the reactions of the daily and student 
newspapers to the events in Oslo.  
Finally, in this thesis the terms «pro-Nazi» and «anti-Nazi» have been replaced with 
the terms «pro-German» and  «anti-German». This decision was made because the terms pro- 
and anti-Nazi are widely used without considering that the individual or group in question 
may have beliefs that contradict the Nazi doctrine. Therefore, it is felt that the terms pro-
German and anti-German allow for more varying views on Germany, because, as will be seen 
in Chapter 2 concerning the German Nordic Idea, several individuals that supported Germany 
did not support the Nazi ideology. 
 
                                                 
6
 By keeping Sweden out of the war, Germany could spare troops to be sent elsewhere. Further, they feared that 
the Swedish miners would destroy the iron-ore mines if the Germans invaded. Germany was only able to 
produce approximately 10m tons of iron ore a year, and the German ore was of low quality. The Swedish iron-
ore was of high quality, and so Berlin were eager to keep on friendly terms with Sweden. The Swedish ore trade 
with Germany ended in November 1944.Wilhelm Carlgren, Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World 
War, Translated by Arthur Spencer, (London: Ernest Benn, 1977), 13.   
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1.2 Historiography  
There is little to no historiography on this subject, since there has not been done any extensive 
research on the Swedish reactions to events at the University of Oslo during the Second 
World War. 
The only historian that has written a larger work concerning one of the Swedish 
educational institutions used in this thesis, is Sverker Oredsson’s , Associate Professor in 
History at Lund University. He has written about Lund University during the Second World 
War in his work Lunds universitet under andra världskriget: Motsättningar, debatter och 
hjälpinsatser. His focus was the conflict between pro-German and anti-German sentiments 
that emerged at the university during the war. He has placed the conflicts at Lund University 
in both a national and an international context. His work has been of great importance for this 
thesis, and even though he has not solely focused upon the reactions towards happenings in 
Norway, it has been possible to use his work to see the reactions of the students at Lund 
University from another perspective. On Uppsala University only shorter works exist, such as 
Världen i Uppsalaperspektiv: Uppsala Studentkår 1930-1990  edited by Torgny Neveus. This 
work have given an insight into Uppsala University’s student newspaper, Ergo, and a short 
introduction to the political leanings at the university. Regarding Stockholm University 
College there are no works that can give insight into the student union or the student 
newspaper, Gaudeamus. There are, however,  two major works about the development of 
Stockholm University College, Stockholms universitet 1878-1978 by Fredric Bedoire and Per 
Thullberg, and Stockholms Högskolas historia före 1950 by Sven Tunberg. T hey have been 
imperative for understanding how the University College endured the war. The lack of works 
on the three institutions during the war means that this thesis has had to focus almost solely on 
primary sources. The difficulties and possibilities related to this approach will be examined in 
subchapter 1.3.1.  
Works written on the Swedish daily newspapers during the war has mostly focused on 
the newspapers’ political leanings and how these were influenced by the events of the war. the 
political leanings of the newspapers have been important for this thesis, and therefore Den 
svenska pressens historia, volumes II and III have been used to discover what they were. Den 
svenska pressens historia describes the development of the Swedish press from before 1830 
and up to modern times, and through volumes II and III it has been possible to follow the 
development of the three daily newspapers used in this thesis. Volume III has been the 
volume that has been used the most, because it concentrates upon the period between 1897 
and 1945. However, the works cannot be used to find how the daily newspapers reacted to the 
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events at the University of Oslo. Therefore, as with the student newspapers, the focus has 
been on the primary sources and the information they may give.   
The focus of this thesis is the Swedish reactions to vioaltions at the University of Oslo 
during the Second World War, and the historiography available on the University of Oslo 
during the war is extensive. Here can only be given a short introduction to this historiography, 
as it would be impossible to include every work that has been written on the subject. The 
earliest works on the university during the war, were published shortly after the war, and were 
written from a personal point of view. The work of Didrik Arup Seip’s work, the Rector of the 
university from 1937 until 1945, published in 1946, focuses on his own experiences from the 
invasion in April 1940 until his arrest in September 1941.
7
 The second major work published, 
was in Volume III in Norges Krig: 1940-1945, written by Sverre Steen, a historian at the 
University of Oslo. Steen’s work was the first work done by a historian, but it is possible to 
see that his personal experiences during the war contributed greatly to how he viewed the 
events that had taken place. A change emerged with  Leif Heggen’s Master Thesis in 1972. 
Whereas the works of Steen and Seip had dealt with their own experiences within the larger 
events at the university, Heggen examined only the issue of resistance at the university during 
the war. In 1978 Adolf Hoel’s book about his involvement at the university during the war 
was published.
8
 Hoel’s book was an attempt to defend his actions during his position as pro-
rector from September 1941, and after he had been appointed Rector in early 1943. In 1994 
Gordon Spangelid’s finished his Master Thesis, and as with Heggen, Spangelid’s narrowed 
his research, and examined only the student population’s resistance to the occupation. In 2004 
Jorunn Sem Fure edited a pamphlet marking the 60 year anniversary of the closure of the 
university in November 1943. Former students that had been studying during the war 
contributed to the pamphlet, as did was historians such as Ole Kristian Grimnes. In 2007, 
Jorunn Sem Fure published her book Universitetet i kamp: 1940-1945, a new and broader 
view of the many events at the university during the war.  
In addition to the reactions from the academics and daily newspapers, this thesis looks 
at the influences that the Nordic Idea and the Swedish government’s relations with the 
Norwegian exile government and Berlin might have had on the reactions. Therefore, a short 
                                                 
7
 Note: The Rector was seen as the legitimate Rector of the university after his arrest, and deportation to 
Germany. The Rector’s experience of being sent to Sachsenhausen in Germany is included in this work as well, 
but it is of no importance for this thesis.   
8
 Note: Adolf Hoel was appointed pro-Rector by NS at the University of Oslo after Rector Didrik Arup Seip had 
been arrested in September 1941, and was given the title Rector by NS in early 1943.  
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presentation of the historiography of both the Nordic Idea and the communication between the 
governments can be useful.  
It has been written so extensively about the Swedish government during the war that it 
is impossible to mention all the books written about the subject. As early as 1945 the Swedish 
Foreign Department published a book about the Swedish government’s connections with 
Denmark and Norway during the war. This book gives a detailed description of these 
connections, and as it contains the Swedish Foreign Department’s own account of the war, it 
can almost be viewed as a primary source. In 1948 Volume II of Norges krig: 1940-1945 was 
published. It contains a contribution from Jens Schive, a Norwegian press attaché who was in 
Stockholm during the war, where he examines the relationship between Norway and Sweden. 
Since the 1940s many books have been published on the subject. 1977 saw the publishing of  
Wilhelm Carlgren’s book Swedish Foreign Policy during the Second World War, and in 1983 
Henrik S. Nissen edited the work Scandinavia during the Second World War. For this thesis 
two works on the subject have been especially important. The first is a chapter written by 
Wilhelm Carlgren in the book Broderfolk i ufredstid:Norsk-svenske forbindelser under annen 
verdenskrig, (edited by Stig Ekman and Ole Kristian Grimnes). Carlgren’s chapter is detailed 
and useful for the understanding of the Swedish governments relations with the Norwegian 
exile government. The other important work is Alf W. Johansson’s book about the Swedish 
war experience of Swedish Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson. This book covers the entire 
spectrum of the Swedish government’s relations with both the Norwegian exile government 
and the German government in Berlin.  
 
1.3 Sources 
The Discourse Analysis is the theoretical foundation of this thesis, and will be discussed more 
thoroughly in Chapter 2. In this subchapter, the theories about media and how they can be 
used in this thesis will be presented. So will the difficulties and possibilities by using 
newspapers as sources in a historical analysis be. The reason for presenting theories about 
media here and not in Chapter 2 with the other theoretical approach, is that it is important to 
understand the theory about newspapers before the difficulties and possibilities of using them 
are presented in subchapter 1.3.2, and eventually the discourse analysis itself in Chapter 2. 
Finally the sources used in this thesis will be presented in subchapters 1.3.3 and 1.3.4.   
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1.3.1 Media theory  
Media theory tends to focus upon how media, i.e. newspapers, television and internet can 
influence a reader and how the reader uses the information provided by the media. It is, 
however, difficult to know how articles that were published seventy years ago were received 
by the public. Therefore, this thesis will use media theory in a different way. Instead of trying 
to use it to figure out how the articles were received by the public, this thesis will use media 
theory to examine how the Swedish government’s relations with the German and Norwegian 
governments influenced the newspaper’s reactions to the events in Oslo. Even though it is 
difficult to know how an article was received by the public, one can get a notion of how of the 
importance of an event by considering the amount of articles published about it.   
There are several theories about media. The «diffusion of innovation» theory argues 
that such innovations as new ideas, stories, products and policies can have an affect upon a 
newspaper’s readers.9 Instead of using this theory to understand the effect the newspapers had 
on their readers, it can be used to review how the Swedish government’s policies on press 
censorship and distribution affected the newspapers. In September 1939, the Swedish 
government presented a decree that encouraged the Swedish newspapers, as John Gilmour 
puts it, «to show care when expressing opinions which could be regarded as offensive to 
foreign governments or bring into question Sweden’s neutrality».10 This encouragement was 
not enough, because in January 1940 the State Information Board (Statens 
Informationsstyrelse, SIS) was established with the task to inform, restrict, survey and direct 
public opinion, and combat foreign propaganda.
11
 The Swedish government had decided to 
use a paragraph in the Freedom of the Press law of 1812, which stated that in case of war, the 
government could stop articles that could threaten the independence and integrity of the 
country.
12
 In addition to the employment of this paragraph, a decree was introduced in March 
1940, hindering newspapers that wrote about such matters that could threaten Sweden’s 
independence from distributing their issues.
13
 
                                                 
9
 Mark Balnaves, Stephanie Hemelryk Donald and Brian Shoesmith, Media Theories and Approaches: A Global 
Perspective, (England: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 65. 
10
 John Gilmour, Sweden, the Swastika and Stalin: the Swedish experience in the Second World War, 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 159. 
11
 Ibid, 160. 
12
 Jörgen Weibull, “Censur och opinionsutveckling”, in Norden under 2.verdenskrig, by Karl Molin, Henrik 
S.Nissen, Magne Skodvin, Hannu Soikkanen and Jörgen Weibull, (Copenhagen: Nordisk 
Ministerråd/Gyldendal,1979), 141. 
13
 Ibid, 142.  
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Another media theory is «agenda setting» which argues that a certain amount of 
exposure to a subject can alter a reader’s opinion of it.14 It is not possible to know how a 
contemporary reader reacted to articles regarding the conflict at the University of Oslo during 
the war, but it can be argued that in discussing a subject in several articles over a period of 
time, the newspaper could have answered the public’s desire for information. This theory 
overlaps with the thought that the media has a social function, a integrative and disintegrative 
function, and that readers are active, not passive, when reading newspapers. The integrative 
function means that the media provides channels of information and symbols, while the 
disintegrative function means that media can destroy relationships and social bonds.
15
 The 
integrative theory is important in relation to the usage of the Nordic Idea, and how it was used 
as a symbol in the support of the Norwegian academics. The disintegrative theory can be 
applied to explain how the Swedish government’s relations with the German government 
could strain the connection between the Swedish and Norwegian governments. 
 
1.3.2 The difficulties and possibilities of using newspapers as sources  
Danuta Reah states that the term newspaper «indicates that the content of the newspaper will 
be primarily devoted to the news of the day, and some analysis and comment on this news».
16
 
This was not always the case when the Swedish student newspapers and daily newspapers 
wrote about the events at the University of Oslo during the war. Sometimes events were 
reported without comment or analysis. In this subchapter the difficulties and possibilities 
associated with using newspapers as sources will be examined.  
It is easy to argue that in the absence of individuals who can be interviewed about past 
events, newspapers can be good sources for understanding the reactions to these events. Hans 
Peter Clausen argues «a historian can never know when the press is portraying the opinion of 
the public, or when the press is the source behind this public opinion».
17
 Clausen also 
mentions a second problem, namely that there could be several errors and mistakes in a 
newspaper’s accounts, and if no secondary sources are present to verify the information, the 
errors can be accepted as facts. What Clausen does not consider is that newspapers can be 
used as both primary and secondary sources. The distinction follows the subject the 
newspaper is used to explain. If this thesis had used the Swedish newspapers to explain what 
                                                 
14
 Balnaves, Hemelryk Donald and Shoesmith, Media Theories and Approaches, 68. 
15
 Ibid, 73.  
16
 Danuta Raeh, The Language of Newspaper, The Second Edition, (London: Routledge, 2002),2.  
17
 Hans Peter Clausen, Aviser som historisk kilde, (Århus: Institut for presseforskning og samtidshistorie, 1962), 
2. 
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had happened in Oslo, the newspapers would be considered a secondary source because they 
based their accounts on information from Norway. Yet, as this thesis uses the newspapers to 
understand the Swedish reception of the events in Oslo, the newspapers are considered 
primary sources.  
A third problem Clausen mentions associated with using newspapers is that in many 
case the articles have no signatory. This has been encountered when writing this thesis, and it 
has made it difficult to get a full and complete understanding of why the student newspapers 
and daily newspapers used certain arguments. This problem has been more prominent with 
the daily newspapers than the student newspapers, and has resulted in the use of the 
newspaper’s own names being used in the thesis, such as «Dagens Nyheter argued» or «GHT 
stated».  
A few difficulties were encountered while researching this thesis. The initial purpose 
of the thesis was to compare and contrast the way the student newspapers Lundagård, Ergo 
and Gaudeamus reacted to and wrote about the events at the University of Oslo. After an 
extensive examination of the reactions in the student newspapers, it was concluded that the 
sources obtained from the three papers would not make a good analysis. It was therefore 
decided that the three daily newspapers, Göteborgs Handels – och Sjöfartstidning, Arbetet and 
Dagens Nyheter, would be included in the analysis.  
It became clear quite early that there were questions that could not be explained only 
by examining the student newspapers and the daily newspapers, for example: Why did the 
Swedish students choose not to comment upon the Norwegian students’ letter of protest in 
February 1943 and the Norwegian professors’ protest letter in September 1943? It was 
therefore decided that the meeting records from the student unions at Lund University, 
Uppsala University and Stockholm University College had to be examined, and in September 
2011 a last trip to the archives in Sweden was carried out to examine these. The archive of the 
student union at Uppsala University was located at the University Library in Uppsala, 
whereas the archives of the Student Unions at Lund University and Stockholm University 
College were found in the local archives of their respective cities. It was decided that the 
meeting records were to only be used as a means to explain why the student papers did not 
write about certain events in Oslo, and to give a more detailed explanation of the events the 
students actually reacted to. The inclusion of the meeting records greatly strengthens the 
analysis of the students reactions.   
There are many difficulties associated with the use of newspapers as sources, but if 
one takes these problems into account, newspapers can open up for new possibilities to 
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understand a society. Through the analysis of their reactions, this thesis will look for the 
political stance of the different newspapers. That the newspapers expressed their political 
opinions will rather be viewed as a positive than a negative aspect. The use of Swedish 
student newspapers also opens up for a better understanding of the relationship between the 
Norwegian and Swedish students. Below a short presentation of the student newspapers and 
daily newspapers used will be given. 
 
1.3.3 The student newspapers 
Ergo and Lundagård were chosen because they belong to the oldest universities in Sweden; 
Uppsala and Lund. Uppsala University was founded in 1477 and Lund University in 1666. As 
the oldest educational institutions in Sweden, Uppsala and Lund were known for their 
conservative outlook. Therefore, Gaudeamus, the newspaper of the more liberal-minded 
Stockholm University College was chosen as a counterweight. Stockholm University College 
was founded in 1878, was a young institution compared to Lund and Uppsala.  
 
Ergo – Uppsala University 
Ergo was founded in 1924 and was from 1926 until 1940 privately owned by Thorsten 
Eklann, a journalist and editor. That Ergo was privately owned meant that the student union 
had no economic responsibilities regarding the student newspaper, but this changed when they 
bought the newspaper in 1940. No remarkable changes occurred when Ergo changed owners; 
it continued to write independently of the student union, and about matters concerning the 
general student population, such as student union questions, student sports, education, 
anniversaries and student health.
18
  
The student newspaper communicated many ideas and discussions emerging at the 
university, including the rightwing oriented. In February 1939 the Uppsala and the Lund 
students announced that they were against whether Sweden should allow Jewish physicians of 
German heritage to enter the country.
19
 Despite this protest being directed against labour 
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 Svante Nycander, ”Världen i Fyrisperspektiv: Uppsalastudenterna 1930 – 1945”, in Världen i 
Uppsalaperpektiv, Uppsala Studentkår 1930-1990, ed. by Torgny Neveus, (Uppsala: Uppsala Studentkår, 1998), 
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 In February 1939 similar meetings were held at Uppsala University and Lund University. The question that 
was raised at the two universities was whether the students should support ten German Jewish Doctors who 
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against, and 342 voted for. Both universities were viewed as hostile to labour immigrants. Sverker Oredsson, 
Lunds universitet under andra världskriget: Motsättningar, debatter och hjälpinsatser, (Lund: Lunds 
universitetshistoriska sällskap), 219.   
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immigration and the effects of such immigration on the students’ future access to work, the 
protest was not well received in the Swedish population. According to Svante Nycander,  the 
psalm writer Torsten Fogelqvist, , stated that «’A cloud has covered up the enlightenment of 
our country’».20 
However, with the German invasion of Norway and their violation of Norwegian 
society, the students at Uppsala University demonstrated their support for their neighbouring 
country through articles in Ergo. The support of Nazism started to diminish with Hitler’s rise 
to power in 1933, and with the invasion of Norway, an outright criticism of Germany 
materialised. Svante Nycander argues that the few students that supported the new German 
ideas made no attempt to hinder the democratic discussions in Ergo, nor did they express any 
form of anti-Semitism in the student newspaper.
21
 It will be of interest to see whether Ergo 
was as conservative as the university it belonged to.  
 
Gaudeamus – Stockholm University College 
“Gaudeamus Igitur” Latin for «Let us therefore rejoice», is the title of a medieval student 
song still used by some universities today.
22
 The student newspaper at Stockholm University 
College, was founded in 1924, and quickly integrated into the student union. As with Ergo the 
editorial was independent of the student union, which only had influence over the content they 
themselves contributed to the newspaper. The political direction of the articles and 
discussions that emerged in Gaudeamus during the Second World War was influenced by the 
occupation of its Nordic neighbours.  
Gaudeamus had since 1924 been the newspaper connected to Stockholm University 
College, but in early 1942, a discussion emerged at the student union whether Gaudeamus 
was to become the student newspaper for the other student unions in Stockholm.
23
 On 
February 6, 1942 the president of the student union argued that Gaudeamus would benefit 
«greatly» if the student newspaper could speak for the entire student population in 
Stockholm.
24
 Yet, by May 1942, after many meetings between the student unions at the 
different university colleges, it was decided that a new student newspaper was to be 
                                                 
20
 Nycander, ”Världen i Fyrisperspektiv”, 31.  
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 Reverso Online Dictionary, Gaudeamus Igitur, Reverso Online Dictionary, 
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24
 Stockholm University College Student Union, ‘§16 Gaudeamus’, 6 February 1942.  
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established. This decision was made because of the extensive criticism that had been directed 
towards Gaudeamus. The representative from the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm 
argued that the student newspaper had certain political tendencies that were not in accordance 
with the views and ideas held at the Institute.
25
 The political tendencies he was referring to 
were regarded the articles that had occurred in relation to the dissolution of DNS, the arrest of 
Rector Seip, and the May 1942 letter of protest in relation to the conflict between NS and the 
Norwegian teachers and clergy.   
 
Lundagård – Lund University   
Lundagård is the oldest student paper used in this thesis. It was founded in 1920, and was 
from the very beginning owned by the student union. The editorial board was elected through 
the student union elections, but once elected they were independent and free to make their 
own decisions about the content of the paper.
26
 
During the Second World War Lund University would be known for its many pro-
German professors and students, but Lundagård was still influenced by events in Sweden’s 
neighbouring countries. The editorials under Ove Möller (1940) and Per Eckberg (1941) were 
very much concerned with the occupation of Norway, and were at one point even criticised 
for their pro-Norwegian stance.
27
 One would think that the students at Lund University would 
have been affected by their geographical proximity to mainland Denmark. Yet, in Chapter 4 it 
will be demonstrated that the Swedish students did not mention Denmark or the Danish 
students, as they hoped that the presence of the Danish King and government would spare the 
country from such grave conditions as experienced in Norway.  
The major event at Lundagård during the war, was the pro-German article in January 
1942, on the arrest of Rector Didrik Arup Seip of the University of Oslo.
28
 This article caused 
quite a stir at Lund, and the student union had no other choice than to dismiss the editorial 
board. The next editorial board, elected in March 1942, returned to the pro-Norwegian 
attitudes of Möller and Eckerberg. It will be of interest to see whether the pro-German 
students and sentiments got any space in the student newspaper.  
                                                 
25
 Stockholm University College Student Union, “§9 Gaudeamus”, 27 March 1942.  
26
 Oredsson, Lunds universitet under andra världskriget, 13-14.  
27
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1.3.4 The daily newspapers  
The daily newspapers that were selected for this thesis, were chosen because of their political 
stance. Below a short presentation of the daily newspapers will be given.  
 
Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning  
Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning (hereafter referred to as GHT) was a liberal daily 
newspaper which was published in Gothenburg in the period between 1832 and 1973.
29
 The 
paper was initially founded as a magazine for trade and shipping messages, but in 1852 the 
magazine was transformed into one of the leading political daily newspapers.  
The newspaper had always been politically independent. This meant that during the 
Second World War, under the leadership of  editor Torgny Segerstedt (1917-1945), the 
newspaper become the foremost critic of the Swedish government’s submissive policies 
towards Berlin. Germany had been interested in GHT since 1933 because of the newspaper’s 
critical discussion Adolf Hitler and his political ambitions. Elisabeth Sandlund argues that the 
war came as a blessing for Segerstedt and GHT, because it was then confirmed that the new 
German regime was “barbaric”. GHT viewed the invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 
1940 as an unprovoked attack, and the newspaper soon criticised the government’s passivity 
in helping its Nordic neighbours.
30
 Even if the newspaper received several warnings and 
several of its issues were confiscated, Segerstedt refused to stop the criticism of the German 
warfare.
31
  
The last issue of the newspaper was published in September 1973. It re-emerged as a 
weekly newspaper in the years 1975-84; the final closure came in 1985 after a short period as 
a daily newspaper.
32
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John Solheim, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning, Store Norske Leksikon, 02.12.2009, 
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“Beredskap och repression (1936-1945)”, in Den svenska pressens historia III: Det moderna Sveriges spegel 
(1897-1945), ed. by Karl Erik Gustavsen and Per Ryden, (Stockholm: Ekerlids Förlag, 2001), 338. 
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Dagens Nyheter  
Dagens Nyheter was established in 1864 by Rudolf Wall, and is today one of the largest 
subscription newspapers in Sweden. It was and still is published in Stockholm.  
Wall’s ambition with Dagens Nyheter was to create a newspaper that would publish 
any news of importance both domestically and abroad. He proclaimed that «in all questions 
freedom is our solution and our goal. The road will be long and the obstacles many».
33
 With 
freedom, Wall meant religious, educational, political and economic freedom, and with these 
ambitions Dagens Nyheter became a liberal, but politically independent newspaper.  
In 1924 Bonnier publishing became the major shareholder of Dagens Nyheter.
34
 Even 
though the Bonnier family declared in 1924 that Dagens Nyheter would write independently 
of the family’s own political stand, this principle would not be observed during the Second 
World War. The Bonnier family wanted the newspaper to take a firmer stand against 
Germany’s policies, but the editorial board was unwilling to succumb to this demand.35 With 
the invasion of Norway and Denmark in April 1940 the conflict would flare up once again, 
but the editorial board would not succumb to the Bonnier family’s wishes that the newspaper 
take a firmer stand against German violations of the neighbouring countries. This changed in 
1942/1943, when Germany started to lose ground in Europe and the pressure on Sweden 
started to diminish. It was now easier for the editorial board to take a firmer stand against the 
German warfare and its occupational politics.  
 
Arbetet  
Arbetet was established in 1887 by Axel Ferdinand Danielsson, and was issued in Malmö 
until it went bankrupt in August 2000.
36
 Arbetet started as a weekly newspaper, and from 
1888 it would be issued three times a week. From 1890 the newspaper was issued every 
afternoons, except on Sundays.
37
    
Arbetet had since it was established in 1887 been a socialistic newspaper with the 
slogan «an forum for the class conscious workers movement», and would in 1888 be the first 
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weekly worker’s newspaper. It was therefore one of the many newspaper in Sweden during 
the 1890s that supported the Social Democrats when the party was established in 1889.
38
  
Therefore, Arbetet supported the Swedish government’s submissive politics towards 
Germany when the Second World War erupted.
39
 This support of the government was mainly 
due to Arbetet’s chief editor Allan Vougt’s (1924-1944) position in the party leadership of the 
Social Democrats’.40 The editor was aware of the threat which Germany posed towards 
Sweden’s neutrality, and supported the idea of giving in to some of Germany’s demands to 
maintain Sweden’s independence and integrity. With the war turned in favour of the Allies 
with Germany losing ground in Egypt during the summer of 1942 and the Soviet Union in 
February 1943, Arbetet changed its stand towards Germany and became quite critical of the 
its warfare. 
 
1.4 Structure 
Chapter 2 will discuss the development of the Nordic Idea and why it is used in this thesis, 
and so will the second theoretical foundation, the discourse analysis, be. 
In Chapter 3 the discussion will concentrate upon the Swedish reactions to the 
dissolution of DNS in September 1940, and the arrest of Rector Didrik Arup Seip in 
September 1941. The analysis will focus upon whether the students newspapers and daily 
newspapers believed it to be NS or the German occupational force that dissolved DNS in 
September 1940, and whether the newspapers had changed their minds about who was the 
aggressors in Norway by the time Rector Seip was arrested in September 1941. 
Chapter 4 will look at two events at the University of Oslo that the Swedish student 
newspapers chose not to comment upon; the Norwegian students’ letter of protest in February 
1943 and the Norwegian professors’ protest letter in September 1943. The discussion will be 
centred upon the notion that the silence of the Swedish students was unusual. This will be 
demonstrated by looking at a protest in May 1942 regarding events in Norway, and their 
willingness to help the Danish students who fled to Sweden in October 1943. It is in this 
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chapter that the differences between the student newspapers and daily newspapers will 
become apparent, because the daily newspapers chose to comment these events that the 
student newspapers did not care for. 
The analysis in Chapter 5 will concentrate itself upon the protests and demonstrations 
from the Swedish population in relation to closure of the University of Oslo on November 30, 
and the arrest of its students and professors. The extent of the reactions in December 1943 
would exceed the responses to the violations at the university in previous years, as even the 
Swedish government and other groups in Swedish society reacted. This chapter will therefore 
differ from the others, because it is necessary to include these responses in order to get a 
bigger picture of the extent of the Swedish reactions.  
The final chapter, Chapter 6, will sum up and conclude on the basis of the arguments 
that have been made throughout the thesis. 
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Chapter 2: The Nordic Idea and Theory 
The reason why an subchapter has been devoted to the explanation of the Nordic Idea is due 
to how this was a concept used during the period on which this thesis concentrates. The idea 
will be used in the analysis to understand why the student newspapers and daily newspapers 
reacted or did not react to events at the University of Oslo during the war. 
The discourse analysis has been brought into this thesis as a theory because it is a 
useful tool to determine why and how the student newspapers and daily newspapers reacted to 
the events in Oslo. The discourse analysis has been important when trying to determine 
whether the Swedish government’s policies had any effect upon the reactions and protests 
from the student papers and daily newspapers. The context and the culturally and social 
environment in which the papers fell under had a lot to say for how their protests were 
formulated.  
 
2.1 The Nordic Idea. 
The Swedish historian Mikael Byström, stated in his book En Broder, gäst och parasit about 
the Swedish perceptions about Nordic refugees in 1942-1947, that he had not linked the 
Nordic Idea to its Scandinavism origin. He stated that he had rather used the term as a tool to 
explain the perceptions and ideas the Swedish had about Nordic refugees, and the 
Scandinavian Jews.
41
 This thesis will however, link the Nordic Idea back to its origin, 
«Scandinavism». The first reason for this is that only through the development of 
Scandinavism can one truly understand the Nordic Idea, and how it can help explain why the 
Swedes wanted to help their Nordic neighbours. The second reason for linking the Nordic 
Idea to its origin is that the term Scandinavism, had been embraced by the academic world 
since its emergence in the 1830s. The third reason for using the Nordic Idea in this analysis is 
because the idea as a concept was widely used during the war.  
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2.1.1 Scandinavism and the Nordic Idea. 
The Swedish academics had been the first to embrace Scandinavism when it appeared in the 
1830s. When the Nordic Idea emerged as Scandinavism’s successor in the 1920s, it became 
popular amongst the Swedish academics, and by the 1940s the term was widely used by 
students and professors alike.  
Scandinavism emerged in the 1830s. Its goal was to unify the three countries 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway in a political union; a union which was arguably similar to the 
Kalmar-union which had emerged at the end of the 1300s.
42
 The ideas behind Scandinavism 
were quickly embraced by both politicians and academics in Denmark and Sweden, but the 
Norwegians were less willing to discuss a ideas that would entwine them even more with their 
two neighbouring countries. Norway had long been united with their neighbours, first with 
Denmark from 1380 till 1814, and from 1814 with Sweden. This made the Norwegian 
academics reluctant to discuss ideas of a national union with its neighbouring academics. This 
certainly put a strain upon the work around Scandinavism, but it did, however, not stop the 
students in Sweden and Denmark from trying to create better relations between the three 
countries. According to Ruth Hemstad, the students saw themselves as the natural 
representatives of their own nations.
43
 
The period between the 1830s and 1864 saw a high frequency of student meetings 
concerning Scandinavism, but the actual movement behind Scandinavism was on the other 
hand unorganised, undeveloped and not institutionalised. Still, the first associations with a 
Scandinavian program and the first Scandinavist journals were established in this period. In 
1864, however, a war between Denmark and Germany erupted, and the work concerning 
Scandinavism suffered. Denmark had hoped that the Swedish- Norwegian union would come 
to its aid, but the union did not answer Denmark’s call for help, and as a result Denmark 
boycotted any future Scandinavian cooperation.
44
 This was the first time that these 
governments had any major disagreement since Scandinavism’s emergence in the 1830s. The 
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academics demonstrated  that disagreements between the governments did not stop academic 
cooperation between the countries.  
These events would eventually change Scandinavism from a politically oriented 
movement in the years before the war to a more culturally based.
45
 Another reason for the 
move away from a political union was done because of the union between Norway and 
Sweden. Norway did not hold the independence required to discuss the political ambitions of 
Scandinavism, meaning that political discussions would end up restrained and limited. 
Instead, Scandinavism took different directions: economic Scandinavism, educational 
Scandinavism and New Scandinavism. Nevertheless, the Norwegians were still sceptical of 
the ideas surrounding Scandinavism; they feared that the two other countries, and especially 
Sweden, still had political ambitions hidden behind their wish for a cultural cooperation.
46
 
This cultural Scandinavism would come into full bloom in the 1890s, when a surge of new 
ideas concerning Scandinavism occurred.  
The new cultural Scandinavism denounced the political Scandinavism, because it was 
argued that the old movement’s political goals were unrealistic and would have been difficult 
to achieve, even if all three countries had been positive to a political union.
47
 The new 
Scandinavism would work for better connections between the Scandinavian countries based 
on the cultural heritage the countries shared; such as language, history and culture. These 
supporters of the cultural Scandinavism would be called «new Scandinavists».  
The student meetings that had occurred during the «old» Scandinavism were both 
criticised and supported by the new Scandinavists. The critics argued that the meetings had 
been founded on a idea that would never come true; the political unification of the three 
countries.
48
 The supporters of the student meetings had themselves attended the student 
meetings. They argued therefore that student meetings would create a feeling of community 
between the new Scandinavists. Ruth Hemstad argues that the student meetings, contrary to 
what the new Scandinavists beliefs, had had a good impact on the promotion of 
Scandinavism.
49
 For their part, the students and professors were on the other hand not 
concerned with what the new Scandinavists thought about their propagation of Scandinavism; 
a sentiment which would follow the academics all the way into the Second World War.
50
 This 
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did not mean that the academics were brought closer to each other. Only through learning 
from one another could the academics understand each other, but the knowledge obtained 
from lectures and meetings did not bring the academics of the three countries closer to each 
other. Their nationalism was too strong and their  actual wish to cooperate with each other too 
weak. Still, these academic meetings at the turn of the century held potential for future 
cooperation, especially for creating a common platform for the universities in Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden.
51
 All such efforts ended with the the split of the union between Norway 
and Sweden in 1905.  
The Swedish reactions towards how the union ended were immense, and the fact that 
Denmark had supported Norway, made matters even worse. The work concerning 
Scandinavism was completely paralysed. It is interesting to note that the newly independent 
Norwegians were the first to approach the now hostile Sweden about Scandinavist 
cooperation.
52
 Whereas the Swedish now viewed Scandinavism as a negative term, the 
Norwegians saw Scandinavism as a way to show their newly won independence. However, 
several other factors, such as Norway’s wish to enter an integrity agreement with Great 
Britain, made the relations between Norway and Sweden plummet.
53
 Even the academic work 
saw a decline, and it actually seemed as the relations between the Scandinavian countries 
would not improve at all.  
Ruth Hemstad argues that Scandinavism experienced a «Nordic winter» with the split 
between Norway and Sweden. Yet, the devastating First World War would turn out to be the 
warm wind that Scandinavism needed. Tensions had started to relax in 1912, and when the 
three kings met in Malmö in 1914, it was the start of a new era for Scandinavian 
cooperation.
54
 However, when the war ended, the term Scandinavism and the new term 
«Nordism» adopted. Nordism, which will be referred to as the Nordic Idea in this thesis, built 
upon cultural Scandinavism. However, the similarities ended here: the Nordic Idea was based 
on the notion that the countries were to an extent equals. Also, the Nordic Idea was more 
inclusive than Scandinavism had ever been: in addition to Denmark, Sweden and Norway, it 
embraced Finland, Iceland and the associated territories Åland, Greenland and the Faeroe 
Islands.  
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The 1920s proved a difficult period for the Nordic Idea, with old conflicts and grudges 
coming back to life. Some argued that Norway would gain nothing through better connections 
with their Nordic neighbours. In the decade after 1905, Norway’s politics had focused upon 
defending their spoils from the break of the union with Sweden.
55
 This made any connection 
with Sweden difficult, though the Swedes had reappointed themselves the sole promoter of 
cooperation between the Nordic countries. The Norwegians attitude lasted well into the 
1930s, but still, the Nordic countries managed to grow a little closer, largely due to the 
economic crisis that emerged in 1929 and the fear of a Second World War.
56
 In 1939 Mauritz 
Enander, the editor of the journal Mellanfolkligt samarbete, published his article ‘Den 
nordiska tanken i praktisk tillämpning’, which discussed the many meetings that had occurred 
between different professions, such as teachers, worker’s unions and farmers,  from the 
Nordic countries.
57
 In his article, Enander argued that the Nordic Idea had become popular in 
the Nordic countries because it could be used as a tool to support each other when needed.
58
 
The Swedish wish to help the Norwegians during the Second World War might have arisen 
from this idea, but as the Norwegians refused any form of Nordic cooperation, there should 
not have been any reason for the Swedish to actually help. However, it can be argued that the 
Swedish wanted to help because it was felt, as Byström argues, that it was their duty to help, 
even if their attempts to help might be met with resistance.
59
 
During the Second World War a strong nationalism emerged in Sweden that embraced 
the ideas of the Nordic countries sharing a history, language and culture, with the Swedish 
students being its main users. In a time when two of the Nordic countries were occupied, a 
third joining the war on Germany’s side and Sweden in the middle of these events, the 
Swedish students used the Nordic Idea to support its Nordic neighbours. That the Swedish 
students used the Nordic Idea, can be demonstrated through, Arne Haugh, a Norwegian 
student in Lund, who stated in March 1942 that «it is of immense value for the Norwegians to 
know that the brother population on the other side of Kjölen, understands them and their 
battle for freedom and independence».
60
 Haugh had a year earlier argued that the Nordic 
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countries had to fight for a unified and free North, because «Together we will stand, apart we 
will fall».
61
 It has to be noted that Haugh’s arguments were not representative for the students 
in Oslo, since he had been influenced by his Swedish colleagues use of the Nordic Idea. It will 
be argued throughout this thesis that this usage of the Nordic Idea would be the reason for 
why the student newspapers and daily newspapers showed support to the Norwegian students 
and professors, because as Philip Houm, a lecturer in Litterateur in Sweden, stated as early as 
May 1940 «it is in Sweden that the Nordic Idea lives the freest and the clearest».
62
 The Nordic 
Idea used in this thesis is therefore from a Swedish viewpoint, and not representative for the 
other Nordic countries. 
The development of the Nordic Idea clearly shows that it is of importance to link the 
idea to its origin, because only this way one can truly understand why the Swedish student 
newspapers and daily newspapers used this idea to react towards the infringements committed 
against the University of Oslo during the Second World War. There is however, another 
concept of the Nordic Idea, which has to be looked into: the German Nordic Idea. This has 
been included in the discussion so as to exclude it in the analysis. 
 
2.1.2 The German Nordic Idea/ pangermanism 
The idea of pangermanism emerged in Scandinavia in the 1830s, simultaneously with 
Scandinavism. While Scandinavism argued for closer relations, even a political union, 
between the Scandinavian countries, pangermanism argued for closer relations between 
Germany and the Nordic countries. With Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, pangermanism 
became a part of Heinrich Himmler’s Schutzstaffel (SS) rhetoric and eventually a part of the 
ideology of the German National Socialism.
63
 The German pangermanism and the 
Scandinavian pangermanism soon separated and took on different outlooks. The German 
pangermanism embraced the National Socialist idea of race and biology, claiming that the 
Germanic (or Nordic race) was superior to all others and that in order to preserve this «pure» 
race, the Germanic peoples had to be united into one state, «Das grossgermanische Reich».
64
 
The idea about race and purity of blood set the German pangermanism apart from the 
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Scandinavian pangermanism, which was built on the idea of relations based on a cultural 
dividend; the word «blood» had no place in the Scandinavian pangermanistic rhetoric. Before 
the Second World War, the Scandinavian pangermanism led Swedish and Norwegian 
intellectuals to seek relationships with their German counterparts, but during the war, the 
German pangermanism turned the same group away from any collaboration with Germany.  
During the 1800s and well into the 1900s, German culture was treasured in Norway 
and Sweden for its language, science, art and its sophistication. Many students from Norway 
and Sweden travelled to Germany in order to benefit from the country’s excellent university 
system and groundbreaking research. Scandinavian pangermanism emerged as an answer to 
this demand amongst Norway and Sweden for a closer relationship with Germany. This idea 
was embraced by Norway in particular, probably because many Norwegians felt no need for 
Norway to get any closer relations with the other Scandinavian countries. In 1872, the cultural 
leader Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson stated that only through Germany would Norway have a 
future.
65
 On the other hand, the Swedish admiration for Germany was based on admiration of 
its culture, language and research. Interestingly, Denmark did not admire Germany the same 
way as Norway and Sweden. This was because of the Danish-German war in 1864. Compared 
to the admiration Sweden and Norway had for Germany, Denmark saw Germany as a threat 
to the country’s independence and integrity.66  
The affinity towards Germany and German culture continued to play an important role 
in Sweden even after the First World War. When Hitler came to power in 1933, some 
individuals, such as Professor Karl Olivecrona at Lund University, started supporting the new 
ideas presented by the Nazis. Not all of Germany’s Swedish supporters were admirers of 
Hitler’s ideas, but a great affinity for the old Germany remained. It would be easy to argue 
that the Swedish government succumbed to the German demands during the war, due to this 
historic affinity, but the decision to do so was rather based on a fear of an German invasion if 
their demands were not met. Germany’s ideological transformation weakened much of the 
Swedish attraction to Germany, and the affinity for the Nordic Idea grew.  
The Norwegian attraction to the German Nordic Idea was strengthened by some of 
NS’s ministers’, such as Minister Sverre Riisnæs, wanted closer relations with the German 
occupational force. The nationalistic ideology had been prominent in NS since 1933, but with 
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the invasion of Germany in April 1940, a pangermanism that argued for a unification with 
Germany got an influential position within NS. This was not the same pangermanism that 
Bjørnson had supported, because as already argued, it was a pangermanism that embraced the 
Nationalist Socialists’ ideas about race and biology.   
 
2.2. Theory: Discourse Analysis 
Before a review of the use of discourse analysis in this thesis, an examination of what a 
discourse analysis entails is of great consequence. It is often said that no one can dictate how 
a person should think, talk or act, but in fact the social codes of society and its different 
groups greatly affect the individual’s way of thinking, talking and acting. Such socially and 
culturally guidelines are neither universal nor are they natural.
67
 But after a while these 
guidelines become norm, and are reflected in the language and writing of a text; it becomes a 
discourse. In other words, a discourse is a way of thinking; a pattern or a context in which to 
interpret the world. Discourse can be found in all situations, because every group has its way 
of thinking. A person who is left wing oriented thinks in completely different terms than a 
right wing oriented person. It is, however, impossible to map out every existing discourse 
there is, because they differ from situation to situation. What can be done is to make use of a 
discourse analysis to find how certain expressions and genres have been communicated to 
create a point of view.
68
  These can direct both the writing and the reading of a text, as well as 
targeting a particular audience. For example, a journalist can assume that the reader of an 
article about stock market can assume that the reader knows the meaning of the different 
terms used, such as «commodity exchanges», «shares» and «liquidity».  If such text norms are 
not followed, the text will not be viewed as meaningful or relevant. Also, discourses change 
over time; most texts written today will probably not be held as important 100 years ahead, 
because by then, new discourses have been created and with them, new text norms.
69
  
The discourse which surrounds a group determines how and why a text is written, but 
the context in which the text is written is just as important. A context is the situation, the 
society and the world which surrounds, has surrounded or will surround a text.
70
 Further, it is 
possible to distinguish between cultural context, situational context and textual context. The 
first, cultural context, is the general cultural environment in which a text is written. The 
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second, cultural context, is the situation the text is read in at any given moment. This means 
that the text was in a different context when it was written than it is when it read today. When 
considering newspaper articles, it is crucial to know the importance a text was regarded with 
in the media at the time it was published. Whether the newspaper was alone in writing about a 
certain subject or not, gives an inclination of the perceived importance of the subject by the 
journalists of the time. Also important as a situational context was the reception of an article 
by its readers; but because many years have passed since the publishing of the articles used in 
this thesis, it is difficult to know how they were received.  In terms of situational context, 
then, it is better to analyse the amount of articles written about the events at the University of 
Oslo during the Second World War, and conclude from this how important the subject was for 
the Swedish students or the daily newspapers. When analysing an article from a newspaper it 
is important to choose a situational context in which to analyse the text. The third, textual 
context, regards the text’s relation to other texts which fall within the same discourse. This 
context determines how a text is written and whether it will be received by the members of the 
discourse as meaningful and relevant.  
How then, has the discourse analysis been used in this thesis? As mentioned in the 
introduction the discourse analysis was brought in to see how and why the student papers and 
daily newspapers reacted to the events at University of Oslo, but before the analysis is carried 
out it is of great importance to determine the discourse the sources is part of. This thesis’s 
main source is the newspaper (student union meeting records not included). The student 
newspapers and daily newspapers fall under the journalistic discourse, and what is interesting 
about this discourse is how the journalists employ society’s discourses to write for a certain 
audience. Is it possible to see a difference between the students use of the academic discourse 
compared to the daily newspapers use of other discourses in the society? It becomes crucial to 
try and find these discourses, because through them it will be possible to find out who the 
writer was directing his article to, whether it was a scientist or the government. It is possible 
that some of the newspapers used fall under a certain political discourse, such as being pro-
German or anti-German. Possibly the student newspapers could fall under these discourses as 
well, but  pro- or anti–German leanings are more pronounced in the daily newspapers. This 
thesis has chosen three very different daily newspapers that are diverse, so that it will be 
possible to get a more varied take on events.  
The social context plays a crucial part in how and why a text is written. Yet, the 
context in which the student papers and daily newspapers wrote was manifold. The articles 
used for this thesis were written in a context where NS or the German occupational force had 
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violated the academic freedom of the University of Oslo, but they were also written in the 
context of a Europe at war and German demands to the Swedish neutrality. This certainly 
influenced how the articles were worded, and how they eventually would be received by their  
readers. An example of a badly received article could be Lundagård’s article about the arrest 
of Rector Didrik Arup Seip in September 1941. Students at Uppsala University and 
Stockholm University College were disappointed because of this article. The article was 
branded as supporting the German occupational force’s violation of the university, and was 
not considered meaningful or relevant in a climate of support for the Norwegian students and 
academics.
71
  
The discourse analysis has been used as a tool for finding the common denominators  
(the Swedish government’s politics or the Nordic Idea?) which determined why the two 
groups reacted to the events at the University of Oslo during the war. Subsequently, these 
findings have been used to determine the differences in the reactions of the student 
newspapers and the daily newspapers. The use of discourse analyse has made it clear that the 
Nordic Idea was present, directly or indirectly, in the Swedish reactions to the events in Oslo. 
Some critics discourse analysis argue that it is impossible for a persons every move to be 
determined by discourse, but for this thesis discourse analysis has been a crucial tool for 
determining the differences between the two groups of newspapers.  
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Chapter 3: «Dignity, Peace and Discipline. The opposite will harm 
us all»
72
 
September 1940 – September 1941. 
The focus of this chapter will be the Swedish reactions to the dissolution of the student union 
at the University of Oslo, DNS, in September 1940 and the arrest of Rector Didrik Arup Seip 
in September 1941. These events took place on the directions of the German occupational 
force.  
The Swedish government had feared a German invasion ever since Norway and 
Denmark were invaded in April 1940. Due to this fear, it is of interest to see whether the 
Swedish student newspapers and daily newspapers considered the German occupational force 
or NS to have disciplined the University of Oslo in September 1940 and September 1941. Is it 
possible to detect a change in who was perceived to have violated the university in the year 
separating these two events? Did the Swedish government’s relations with the German 
government and the Norwegian exile government have an impact on whom the student 
newspapers and the daily newspapers portrayed as the prosecutor?  
It is of importance to keep in mind the main questions of this thesis. Is it possible to 
detect a difference between the student newspapers’ and daily newspapers’ coverage of these 
two events? Were there any similarities? These events were the first events at the University 
of Oslo that the Swedish student newspapers and daily newspaper mentioned since the 
invasion of Norway. How did the Nordic Idea manifest itself?  
 
3.1 The Student Union at the University of Oslo is dismantled   
On September 21, 1940, DNS held a meeting where the ideas of creating a Norwegian front 
against NS and the occupational force, were to be discussed.
73
 The 70 year old Dr. Johan 
Scharffenberg held a speech about the bold decisions made by King Haakon in 1905 and 1940 
respectively; the first being his decision to become king of Norway, the second his refusal to 
submit to the German demands for his abdication.
74
 Approximately 600 students attended the 
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meeting, and Scharffenberg’s speech was very popular. The meeting was a success because it 
showed that the dominant student groups were against the German occupation of Norway.
75
 
That the meeting had discussed political questions harmonised with the idea in which the 
union had been created under in 1813.  
DNS had been established in 1813, with the goal of creating an arena where students 
could discuss the on-goings at the university, but also political events in Norway and 
abroad.
76
 By the 1930s there were a variety of organisations and groups at the university 
which gave the students plenty of opportunities to express their political opinions, but the 
union had not lost its place as the main podium for political discussion.
77
 The discussions at 
DNS were influenced by the fact that many of the groupings represented in DNS were either 
oriented to the far left or the far right. The Marxist oriented group «Mot Dag» won most of 
the discussions at the student union, largely due to their debating technique, and their knack 
for mobilisation, which was made easier by the positions that members of Mot Dag held in 
different organisations, offices and editorials.
78
 Mot Dag’s dominance made DNS less 
attractive for other political groups. In the autumn of 1933 a few groups, including NS student 
group, mobilised to overthrow Mot Dag from its leading position within the student union. 
This move was unsuccessful, but a similar mobilisation managed to create a more diverse 
DNS in 1936. However, the fascist views held by the NS students did not get a prominent 
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place in the student union. These political views had to be expressed at other platforms than 
DNS.  
John Sanness was elected president of DNS during the autumn of 1940, and his goal 
for the union was to create an organisation where all groups and organisations, except NS, 
were represented. By the autumn of 1940 Norway had been occupied for about six months, 
and even though there was as of yet no organised resistance movement, people had started to 
silently resist the German advances, and DNS was no exception. The new board of DNS, with 
Sannes as president, spoke of creating a Norwegian front, that would differ from NS’s idea of 
a national unity. As stated above, a meeting was held on September 21, 1940. The outcome of 
this meeting was devastating; Sannes and Scharffenberg were arrested and the student union 
was dissolved by the German occupational force. Jorunn Sem Fure argues that this meeting 
has been recognised as one of the important events in DNS’s history. That 600 students 
attended the meeting demonstrates the importance of the meeting within the student 
population at the university.
79
 
The Swedish students reacted to these violations. In November 1940, Gaudeamus’ 
editorial stated that «The Norwegian students, who we see as our close friends and colleagues, 
have been discriminated against, because of their decision to protect Norway’s political and 
cultural independence».
80
 Further on, Gaudeamus reported that «It is to the Norwegian 
students’ imperishable honour that they have not thrown out their ideals for some temporary 
advantages». Gaudeamus’ statement was followed up in Lundagård, with Per Eckerberg, a 
left-wing student at Lund University, stating that the Norwegian students’ honour was 
undefiled because of their reluctance to surrender to the threat which was presented by the 
arrest of Sannes and Scharffenberg.
81
 On October 19, 1940, doctoral student Eva 
Wennerström-Hartmann stated in Ergo that «No one can argue that the events do not concern 
us».
82
 That the dissolution of DNS would concern the Swedish students was not surprising, 
considering that the students had created good relations with the Norwegian students through 
pursuing the Nordic Idea. With the invasion of Norway and Denmark the Nordic Idea had 
gained new meaning, because it became even more important to protect the idea of a Nordic 
bond founded upon a common language, history and culture. As the sole promoters of the 
Nordic Idea, the Swedish students saw the dissolution of DNS as a blow against the future 
                                                 
79
 Sem Fure, Universitetet i kamp, 115. 
80
 Editorial, “Oslo-Lund”, Gaudeamus, Volume Number 17, No.7, November 1940.  
81
 Per Eckerberg, ”Nationellt och internationellt”, Lundagård ,Volume Number 19, No.8, 9 November 1940. 
82
 Eva Wennerström-Hartmann, “Erinran”, Ergo, Volume Number 17, No. 9 and 10, 19 October 1940.  
 31 
 
relations between the Nordic countries. Yet, with the opposition that the Norwegian students 
had formed against the new regime, there was still a hope that the relations between Norway 
and Sweden would be possible to rebuild after the war, because as Gaudeamus stated «they 
(Norwegian students) could win the whole world, but not forfeit their souls».
83
 It is clear that 
the Swedish students saw the dissolution of DNS as important, but to whom did the Swedish 
students believe that the Norwegian students were not losing their soul? Did they see NS or 
the German occupational force as the aggressors?   
Wennerström-Hartmann stated that DNS had been dissolved because of 
«demonstrations and organised resistance towards NS».
84
 Gaudeamus reasoned that Quisling 
had seen no other option than to dissolve the student union, because threats about arrests and 
regulations had not had an effect upon the student population.
85
 Sverker Oredsson has argued 
that Eckerberg stated in clear text that it was the Germans that had violated the University of 
Oslo’s student union; but an examination of Eckerberg’s article reveals that he never stated 
whether he believed NS or the Germans to be the perpetrators.
86
 It can be reasoned that 
Oredsson builds his argument upon the assumption that Eckerberg meant the German 
occupational force, which is interesting since Oredsson stated simultaneously that Lund 
University published a text from the Swedish news agency Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå (the 
daily newspapers news agency, T.T) that the students union in Oslo had been dissolved 
because it had opposed NS.
87
 Due to this text from T.T it is feasible to reason that Eckerberg 
meant NS also. Is it possible that the reason why the Swedish students did not mention the 
occupational force was because of the Swedish government’s fear of a German invasion?  
The Germans never had any specific plans about invading Sweden, because they 
thought it best that  Sweden stayed neutral. However, the Swedish government fear of an 
invasion was present, and in the months after the invasion of Denmark and Norway, the 
Swedish government adopted a form of policies adjusted to Berlin’s warfare. In order to stay 
neutral, the Swedish government saw that it had to give in to some of the demands presented 
by the government in Berlin. This was made clear when, as the war in Norway was concluded 
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during the summer of 1940, the Swedish government permitted the German government the 
use of the Swedish railway system to transport German soldiers to Norway.
88
 In Chapter 1 it 
was mentioned that to stay neutral the Swedish government urged the press to show care 
when writing about the war, so as to avoid that foreign governments felt that they were 
criticised or that Sweden’s neutrality was brought into questioning.89  
It is therefore feasible that in not mentioning that it was the German occupational force 
that had dissolved the students’ union, the students had taken into consideration the 
government’s request to show care when writing about the war. Indirectly this gives an 
indication of the influence the government had upon how the student newspapers wrote about 
the events in Oslo. Even Oredsson argues that the students at Lund University had supported 
the government’s submissive politics towards the German government in the first years of the 
war.
90
 Yet, if the students had followed the government’s policies rigorously, then there 
would not have been any comment about the dissolution of the student union in Oslo; for if 
one is to take into account Jörgen Weibull’s argument that the Germans in Stockholm 
commented on any article critical of either Germany and its allies, then the student 
newspapers were in danger of  aggravating the Germans when they wrote of the events at the 
University of Oslo, since NS and Quisling was under German control.
91
 Interestingly, Jens 
Schive argues that the Germans did not care for the criticism of NS in the Swedish press. Yet, 
the outcome of this meant that many Swedes started to believe that the German occupational 
force in Norway was well behaved, whereas NS was the aggressors.
92
 
In  this subchapter it has been argued that the Swedish students reactions to the 
dissolution of DNS was based upon the idea that it was the honour of the Norwegian students 
that they had not given in to the threats from NS or the German occupational force. It was also 
argued that the Swedish students had blamed NS for the dissolution of DNS, even though it 
had been the occupational force. That the Swedish daily newspapers did not comment on this 
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event gives an indication of what was seen as important for the two groups of newspapers. In 
the following subchapter it will be demonstrated that the differences between the newspapers 
will be more unclear, and the similarities more prominent. 
 
3.2 The arrest of Rector Didrik Arup Seip 
Didrik Arup Seip was born August 31 1884 in Østfold. Seip became interested in the 
Norwegian language quite early, especially dialects. In 1911 he finished his last exam in 
language history, and went on to pursue a career in research.
93
 In 1937, Seip was elected as 
rector at the University of Oslo, and three years later Germany invaded Norway. Seip was one 
of a few men that were appointed to be a part of the Administrasjonsråd, a council given the 
task of easing the Norwegian people into the occupation. This council had been established by 
the Supreme Court to take care of the Norwegian people’s interests during the occupation. 
Before the Administrasjonsråd was dissolved on September 25, 1940, Rector Seip had been 
responsible for the Department of Church and Education. His role on this council did not 
mean that Seip supported the Germans. On the contrary, he was seen as a man of resistance, 
and one would speak of «the spirit of Seip». When the Administrasjonsråd was dissolved Seip 
went back to leading the university through the difficult war situation. This was not an easy 
job, but with the parole «Dignity, Peace and Discipline. The opposite will harm us all», Seip 
managed to keep the university under control.
94
   
Joseph Terboven was, however, not pleased with Seip’s control over the university, 
and on September 11, 1941 Seip was arrested. The day before, a strike at the city harbour had 
led to the declaration of a state of emergency, and the two workers’ union leaders Viggo 
Hansteen and Rolf Wickstrøm were executed.
 95
 The next day, the students and professors at 
the university were summoned for a meeting in the Assembly Hall where the minister of the 
Church and Education Department, Ragnar Skancke, was to give an orientation about the 
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situation Oslo was in. When the students and professors entered the hall, German soldiers and 
police officers were lined up along the walls.
96
 
SS- Sturmbannführer Dr. Werner Knab, the leader of the Gestapo in Norway, was the 
first to speak on behalf of the Höhrerer SS – und Polizeiführer Wilhelm Rediess.97 After a 
long and aggressive speech where he demonstrated his furry over the Norwegian ill will that 
was shown towards the German generosity, he dismissed the rector and the Academic 
Collegiums.
98
 Skancke had been given the authority to act as rector, and after the speech by 
Dr. Knab, Skancke addressed the attendees with the statement «It is a University’s task to 
illuminate the ideas of truth for the people».
99
 The ideas of truth in which Skancke was 
referring to, was represented by Dr. Knab and the German soldiers. How did the Swedish 
students and daily newspapers react to this second blow against the University of Oslo? 
Almost a year had passed since DNS had been dissolved and its president arrested. Had the 
sentiments of who were to be blamed for the violations changed? How did the Swedish daily 
newspapers, which had not reported about DNS, write about the events, and was the students 
newspapers, influenced by how the daily newspapers wrote about the events in Oslo or did 
they, still follow the policy of the government? In Chapter 2 it was mentioned that the article 
concerning the arrest of Rector Seip was not received well by the student population at Lund 
University, because of the article’s pro-German outlook. The editorial had since it was elected 
in November 1941 been accused of being pro-German. Was the editorial pro-German, and if 
not, why had the article been published? Is it possible to argue that the editorial had been 
accused of being pro-German by its opponents at Lund University? 
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 3.2.1 A reaction 
«The University has failed the Germans», a heading in Dagens Nyheter read on 
September 12, 1941.
100
 This indicates that the daily newspaper was aware about who had 
made the arrest in Oslo. The article that followed contained a detailed article of what had 
taken place in Oslo; that the rector had been overthrown and Academic Collegiums dissolved, 
and that both Dr. Knab and Skancke had held individual speeches. The exact same article was 
printed in GHT and Arbetet. It was stated that Knab had said that Terboven had expected to 
find individuals with an intellectual understanding at the university, but that this had not been 
the case.
101
 The excerpt from Skancke’s speech included the statement that «I have to urge the 
university’s students and teachers to become aware of the responsibility the university has in 
guiding the Norwegian people».
102
 Skancke’s statement was in complete accordance with Dr. 
Knab’s proclamation that «A student that will not cooperate, opts out for the rest of his or hers 
life». That Dagens Nyheter had such a strong heading, and that Arbetet wrote this strongly 
about the event, does not coincide with arguments that the two newspapers did not take a firm 
stand against Germany before 1942/1943. It is feasible that the daily newspapers wrote about 
the arrest because of the pro-Norwegian opposition that had emerged in Sweden as a result of 
the shootings of Hansteen and Wickström, and the arrest of Rector Seip in Oslo.
103
 There is 
no direct connection between the emergence of the pro-Norwegian opposition and the articles 
in the daily newspapers, but it can be reasoned that since the Swedish daily newspapers wrote 
about the shootings as well as the arrest of Rector Seip, they were helping to enhance the 
importance of the pro-Norwegian opposition. The fact that the daily newspapers did not 
themselves comment on the arrest of Rector Seip can give an indication that the newspapers 
were hoping that the publishing of excerpts from the speeches would allow the Swedish 
population themselves interpret what was event in Norway.  
The pro-Norwegian opposition was also an answer to the Swedish government’s 
attitude towards the Norwegian exile government. In deciding in 1940 that the only way to 
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keep neutral was to succumb to German demands, the  Swedish government had alienated the 
Norwegian exile government. The Norwegian exile government had never proposed for the 
Swedish government to enter the war on the Allies side, but the exiled government had hoped 
that the Swedish government would be receptive of any Norwegian wishes. Issues such as the 
transit of German soldiers through Sweden, the Norwegian ships in Gothenburg, the 
diplomatic representation through an envoy and the Norwegian government’s decision to cut 
all contact with Finland, who had entered the war on Germany’s side, made the relations 
between the Swedish and Norwegian government drop to such a low point that it was said that 
not even peace would repair the relations.
104
 These bad relations were probably the reason 
why the Swedish Prime Minister, Per Albin Hansson, and the Foreign Minister, Christian 
Günther in Sweden, feared a pro-Norwegian opposition; it was impossible to predict what the 
German reaction would be if the Swedish population started criticising the German warfare. 
Germany had several interests in Sweden, most importantly the ore supply (crucial for the 
German metal production), and the transportation of soldiers to Norway. Therefore, the 
Germans wanted the Swedes to stay positive to the German warfare in both Europe and 
Norway. Yet, the Swedish government did not view the German interest in Sweden as 
positive, but rather as a threat. Therefore, when the Swedish national organisation for 
workers’ unions published a strongly worded letter concerning the executions of the two 
workers’ union leaders in Oslo, the two ministers tried to stop the statement. However, the 
effort was fruitless, because the BBC managed to get hold of the letter and broadcasted it all 
over the world.
105
  
Whereas the student newspapers had reacted to the dissolution of  DNS in September 
1940 because of their academic relations to the Norwegian students, the daily newspapers 
reacted to the events of September 1941, because a pro-Norwegian opposition had emerged in 
Sweden. This opposition claimed to protect the interest of the Norwegians and their desire for 
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a free and peaceful Norway, built upon the Nordic Idea.
106
 Did the Swedish students argue 
from a pro-Norwegian oppositional point of view? It has to be reasoned that the student 
newspapers had in September 1940, not argued from a oppositional point of view since they 
supported the government’s careful politics, but certainly from a pro-Norwegian standpoint 
due to mentioning of the Nordic Idea. In September 1941 Ergo would  continue to argue from 
a pro-Norwegian point of view after September 1941, but then with a more oppositional 
streak. Gaudeamus would be at first be hindered by its student union to make a comment, and 
in Lundagård the initial purpose of the article in January 1942 had been to argue from a pro-
Norwegian standpoint, but was hindered by a publisher that wanted to follow the Swedish 
government’s careful politics. The student newspaper Ergo was the first to make a comment.   
In its issue on September 20, 1941, Ergo published an interesting article concerned 
with the arrest of Rector Seip. The writer Ingemar Hedenius argued that it was difficult to 
know whether it had been the German occupational force or NS that had issued the state of 
emergency and made the arrest of Rector Seip, because as the writer stated, the name Quisling 
had become the word for ambiguity.
107
 Yet, the writer made clear that it had been the German 
occupational force that had announced the state of emergency and arrested of Rector Seip. 
Hedenius argued that the fight between Quisling and the Norwegian people had reached a 
new culmination point, and the Germans had therefore decided that they could not let 
Norwegian politicians get in the way of their efforts to control the population.
108
 What the 
writer meant by Quisling’s culmination point, and the German effort to get the Norwegian 
population under its control, is not explained, but it is possible that Hedenius meant 
Quisling’s failure to suppress the Norwegian resistance movement, which had blossomed 
during 1941. It is feasible that Hedenius, in his statement about the German efforts to gain 
control of the population, referred to the German fear that the war would be decided in 
Norway. In case of an invasion from Great Britain, the German would need Norway to stay 
stable because no extra troops could be spared. Ohto Manninen argues that Hitler «feared that 
this country would be the object of a joint Anglo-Soviet assault», which caused him to order 
reinforcement of the troops in Norway and a strengthening of the coastal defences, so as to 
hinder an invasion.
109
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Hedenius continued to argue that the Swedish students had not been able to do 
anything for their «brother», i.e. the rector, in Norway. The fact that he used the word brother 
about the rector,  demonstrates how the Nordic Idea was used during the war. the word 
brother was as a reference to the ideas that the Nordic countries were unified through a bond 
that was founded upon the idea of a common history, language and culture. As argued in 
Chapter 2, the Norwegian student Arne Haugh argued that it was of immense value to know 
that the «brother population» understood the Norwegians battle for freedom. The next 
sentence in Hedenius’ article is even more interesting, because he argued that «In contrast to 
the Swedish workers, we are not able to formulate a protest in the form of a appeal to our 
German colleagues’ legal consciousness».110 «Where are now the great German student 
unions?» Hedenius enquired. The explanation to Hedenius’ question lies in the fact that after 
Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 the German universities had been purged of all Jewish and 
politically unwanted lecturers and students.
111
 The universities had been reorganised after the 
Führer principle, which meant that the leader of a group or an organisation had the authority 
to make any decisions without the consent of the members in a group or organisation. Many 
students started as well to wear uniforms and many had become members of Nazi groups such 
as Sturm Abteilung (SA) and SS. It is therefore unlikely that the Germans students would 
have reacted to such a plea in a way that the Swedish students would find satisfying. On the 
contrary, it is feasible that the German students saw the arrest of the rector as the only way to 
execute the German political ideas upon the Norwegian population. With this article, Ergo 
had showed that they did not always follow the government’s policy. It would however take a 
few months before it became clear where Gaudeamus stood on this issue. The reason it took 
almost six months before Gaudemaus commented the arrest of Rector Seip, was the 
indecisiveness of the student union at Stockholm University College.     
In February 1942 the student union at Stockholm University College discussed what 
they should do in relation to the arrest of Rector Seip. It is mentioned in the meeting records 
that someone had contacted some political parties (it is not mentioned which ones) to ask how 
the students should react to such a violation. The advice that was given to the student union 
was that they should react in their own way, because, it was argued, a response for such a 
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cause, would be more of a humanitarian reaction than a political one. However, the president 
of the union did stated that it could be difficult for a third party to distinguish between a 
humanitarian and political protest, since a letter of protest had to be based upon the Nordic 
Idea.
112
 Several members of the union agreed with the President. It was stated that «through 
such a remonstration, it will eventually make it easier to bring the Norwegian and Finnish 
students together in the future». Yet, the discussion at Stockholm University College ended 
with the union not making any statement, because as it was argued «If the risk of being 
misinterpreted after making a statement was that great, it was better not making any protest at 
all».
113
 Who did the student union imagine the misinterpreted to be? It is feasible, considering 
the government’s fear of a German invasion, that the student union believed that the Germans 
could misinterpret the protest as one of politics instead of humanitarianism. Even though the 
student union had decided that no statement was to be made due to the risk of it being 
misinterpreted, the student paper Gaudeamus published an article in March 1942 where it was 
argued that the students had waited for a statement on the arrest from higher instances, but 
that had never arrived.
114
 It is feasible that the student paper was referring to its own student 
union’s unwillingness to make a statement on the issue, as well as the university’s 
administration’s silence.  
In this subchapter it has been demonstrated that compared to the reactions to the 
dissolution of DNS in September 1940, both the Swedish daily newspapers and the student 
newspapers reacted to the arrest of Rector Seip. It has as well been demonstrated that the 
support of the Norwegian rector was showed through the pro-Norwegian opposition and the 
Nordic Idea. It was also argued that the student newspaper Ergo had a strongly written article 
by Ingemar Hedenius where it was made clear that it was the Germans that had made the 
arrest of the rector, and that Gaudeamus did not comment upon the arrest before March 1942. 
In the subchapter following, it will be looked at the article that was published in Lundagård in 
January 1942 and the accusations that the editorial publishing it was pro-German. 
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3.2.2 Lundagård 
In January 1942 Lundagård published perhaps the most controversial of all of the articles 
written about the arrest of Rector Didrik Arup Seip.  
From Norway we have received an announcement which states that the Rector at Oslo 
University, Didrik A. Seip – who was dismissed on 12 September 1941 and brought to 
Grini concentration camp – has been sentenced to 30 days of water and bread in a dark 
cell. If this is true, then the “discipline” of the Norwegian academics and students has 
reached a new culmination point. We understand that the war creates measures that 
could seem hopelessly unnecessary. We are also able to conceive a sense of irritation 
over the passive resistance that has forced the government in Norway to send a 
number of students and academic teachers to concentration camps, as well as 
restricting the academic freedom. Yet, the mentality that can allow for the torture that 
the almost 60- year old rector is going through, will never create a reasonable 
reorganisation of the Norwegian society.
115
 
In the previous subchapter the discussion was centred on the question of whether Ergo 
and Gaudeamus had argued that it had been the occupational force or NS  that had arrested 
Rector Seip. The discussion in relation to Lundagård will be concentrated on the question of 
whether the editorial board that published the article about Rector Seip was pro-German or 
not. Was this article published because the editorial board was pro-German, or was the article 
merely an act of bad judgment? If the editorial board was not pro-German, where did the idea 
of it being pro-German originate from? 
In the first hours after it had been elected in November 1941, the editorial board that 
was considered pro-German. This was due to a belief that the election had been a coup staged 
by Per Gunnar Nordin, a right wing students, and Eric Starfelt, the President of the Christian 
Society.
116
 The Christian Society was one of the strongest societies at Lund University when 
it came to memberships, and by aligning himself with Starfelt, Nordin had secured that during 
the election his nominated editorial board would be elected. On the day of the election, when 
the offices of the student union had been elected and the voting participants were few, Nordin 
saw his chance to nominate Sten Gagnér (Law), Bertil Nosslin (Medicin), Gudmund Smith 
(Philosophy), Magnhild Rydén (Philosophy) and Håkan Strömberg (Law) for the 1942 
Lundagård editorial board.
117
 Did the election mean that the editorial board was pro-German?  
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Håkan Strömberg, a pro-Norwegian student, had been elected to be the leader of the 
editorial board, but he withdrew shortly after the election had been completed. Magnhild 
Rydén became his replacement. Strömberg’s reason for withdrawing was because he had been 
put on the victorious editorial board’s list without his consent. Further, Strömberg stated that 
the composition of an editorial board had to be homogeneous, and since the new editorial was 
in opposition to the pro-Norwegian and pro-Nordic ideas of the previous editorials, he had no 
other choice than to withdraw.
118
 Strömberg’s argument that the new editorial board was in 
opposition to the previous editorial boards was to some extent true, because Gudmund Smith 
and Sten Gagnér had certain pro-German features. Smith was the son of chemistry Professor 
Lennart Smith at Lund University, who was known for his pro-German sentiments. Smith 
might have been influenced by his father, when he in 1939 supported the student union’s 
decision to protest against the immigration of Jewish doctors from Germany. Gagnér was an 
acquaintance of Professor in procedural law, Karl Olivecrona, a lawyer, legal philosopher and 
supporter of Germany. Also, Gagnér wrote for the right-wing newspapers’ Den svenske 
folksocialisten, and Student Forum.
119
  On the other hand, the other two members, Magnhild 
Rydén and Beril Nosslin, had no pro-German views. Rydén had been one of the few that had 
opposed the student union’s decision to protest against the Jewish doctors.120 It can therefore 
be argued that Rydén and Nosslin outweighed the sentiments held by Gagnér and Smit. Also, 
it is likely, as Oredsson argues, that the purpose with the editorial board was not to make the 
student newspaper pro-German, but rather to remove the strong anti-German, pro-Norwegian 
and left-wing sentiments that had influenced the student paper during the editorials of Ove 
Möller and Per Eckerberg.
121
 If this was the case, why then, had the editorial board been 
portrayed as pro-German? 
The answer to this question can be found by looking at Per Eckerberg. Anna Alsmark 
argues that under Eckerberg’s editorial leadership in 1941, Lundagård was turned into a 
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forum where only one form of opinions were allowed to be articulated.
122
 Views that went 
against the pro-Norwegian and anti-German ideas of the editorial board were not welcome. 
This makes his reactions towards the new editorial board with its pro-German members, 
nothing out of the extraordinary. It is feasible that his political left wing views, and his fear 
that through a pro-German editorial board at Lundagård, Lund University would solely be 
known for its pro-German views and not its pro-Nordic beliefs. It can therefore be argued that 
the new editorial board was not initially pro-German, but that Eckerberg had because of his 
political beliefs, led a personal crusade against the editorial board. He was arguably not able 
to see that the editorial wanted to open up for more than just one point of view. That he was 
not able to see this, would be the downfall of the editorial.  
If the editorial was not pro-German, why then was the article published? This was due 
to bad judgment during the editing of the initial article:  
From Norway we have received an announcement which states that the Rector at Oslo 
University, Didrik A. Seip – who was dismissed on 12 September 1941 and brought to 
Grini concentration camp – has been sentenced to 30 days of water and bread in a dark 
cell. If this is true, then the persecution of the Norwegian academics and students has 
reached a new culmination point. We understand that the war creates measures that 
could seem hopelessly unnecessary. We are also able to conceive a sense of irritation 
over the passive resistance that has forced the German occupational force in Norway 
to send a number of students and academic teachers to concentration camps, as well as 
restricting the academic freedom. Yet, Rector Seip’s “disciplinary punhisment” 
demonstrates a brutality that could never be excused nor defended. You may talk ever 
so much about a new Europe and a new culture, but the mentality that can allow for 
the torture which the almost 60-year old Rector Seip is going through, will never 
create a reasonable reorganisation of the Norwegian society.
123
 
When Oscar Bjurling, the responsible publisher of the student newspaper, proofread 
the initial article he urged the editorial board to cut the reference to the new regime being 
«brutal», as well as the reference to the «new Europe». That the editorial board had planned to 
publish the article as shown above, can give an indication that the editorial board had no plans 
to turn Lundagård into a forum for pro-German sentiments. This demonstrates also that the 
pro-German sentiments of Smith and Gagnér was not of relevance when their Nordic 
colleagues had their rights violated. When asked about why he had changed the article, 
Bjurling stated that a publisher’s duty was to stop any articles that were not in accordance 
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with the Press Law at any given moment.
124
 This demonstrates that he wished to follow the 
government’s encouragement to not criticise foreign country’s warfare or to bring Sweden’s 
neutrality into question. Yet, in his eagerness the publisher managed to make the article sound 
as it supported the arrest of the rector. If one is to take into account Rydén’s argument from 
her first editorial, the editorial board supported the rector. «It is of importance for the new 
editorial to support the Finnish, Danish and Norwegian students in their hardship», and she 
concluded «the North is our homeland».
125
 It is apparent that the editorial was more 
concerned with supporting the Norwegian students and its rector, than to support the German 
warfare. Yet, since it was the edited the article that was published, this gave the opposition to 
the editorial board a reason to contact the student union 
At a student meeting on February 12, 1942, Jöran Mjöberg and Paul Lindblom, 
students at the university and close acquaintances of Eckerberg, argued that the article showed 
a lack of judgment from the editorial board.
126
 The editorial board tried to argue before the 
student union that it had not been the intention of the editorial to support the arrest of Rector 
Seip. Yet, because of strong reactions from the students at Lund the editorial board was 
dismissed.
127
 Through the dismissal of the editorial board, the student union made clear that 
there was no room at the university for sentiments that supported a «brutality that could never 
be excused nor defended». It was as well an indication that the student union supported the 
arrested Rector Seip. Had it not been for the publisher’s wish to change the article, the 
Lundagård editorial board would have contributed with an article that would have showed that 
the newspaper supported the rector and not his violaters. The initial article would as well 
contributed to bettering Lund University’s reputation.    
In this subchapter it has been argued that the editorial that published the allegedly pro-
German article about the arrest of Rector Seip, was not pro-German, but that this had been a 
rumour set out by the opposition to the editorial. The article was also merely a act of bad 
judgment from the editorial in question, and can therefore not be argued to have been 
published because the editorial was pro-German. 
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3.3 Summary 
The reactions from the Swedish student papers and daily newspapers differed in connection to 
the dissolution of DNS and the arrest of Rector Didrik Arup Seip.  
The daily newspapers did not comment upon the dissolution of DNS, but the student 
papers did. The reactions were many, and the Swedish students showed that they respected 
the Norwegian students, because they had not left their ideals for some temporary advantages. 
Gaudeamus stated that the Norwegian students could win the whole world, and never lose 
their souls. It was the overall impression of the Swedish student newspapers that it had not 
been the Germans, but NS that had dissolved DNS and arrested Sanness and Scharffenberg. 
This belief was probably due to the Swedish government’s wish to not encourage a German 
attack on the Swedish independence and integrity. The fear of a German invasion was in 
September 1940 alive in Sweden.  
By September 1941 the fear of an German invasion was still present, but the daily 
newspapers was not stopped by this and mentioned that the German occupational force had 
ordered the arrest of the rector. It was argued that the daily newspaper mentioned the arrest 
because of the emergence of the pro-Norwegian opposition in Sweden. It was reasoned that 
by commenting upon the violations towards the University of Oslo, the daily newspapers 
opened up for the Swedish population to interpret the events in Oslo themselves.  
The reaction to the arrest of Rector Seip differed in the three student papers. Ergo was 
clear in its statement that the Germans had made the arrest of the rector. The student paper in 
Stockholm, on the other hand, was at first stopped by the student union that was not willing to 
make a statement in connection with the arrest of the rector, because it was feared that a 
statement could be misinterpreted by a third party to be a political letter of protest, and not a 
humanitarian. Gaudeamus did make a comment upon the arrest, where it was argued that the 
students in Stockholm had waited for a statement from the union that had not come.   
The Lundagård article caused quit a stir at Lund University in January and February 
1942. It was concluded that the editorial was not pro-German because of the article, but that 
this idea was a rumour set out by the editorial board’s opposition. The article had been 
published after specific amendments of the publisher, who had a wish to follow the 
government’s careful politics towards foreign governments. The article was simply an 
unfortunate streak of bad judgment from the editorial board. Had the initial article been 
published, Lundagård would have had the strongest protest against the arrest of Rector Seip.  
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Was the Nordic Idea present at these reactions? In Ergo it was argued in September 
1940 that «No one can argue that the events does not concern us», which can be an indication 
that the Swedish students felt they had a duty to protect the interests of the Norwegian 
students. In September 1941 the daily newspapers showed that the Nordic Idea was present 
through the support of the pro-Norwegian opposition. The student newspapers support of the 
Nordic Idea in September 1941 differed. In Ergo, Hedenius used the word «brother» when 
arguing that the students had not been able to aid the rector. Stockholm University College’s 
student union was afraid that a protest of a humanitarian calibre would be misinterpreted, and 
resigned therefore from making a statement. The article in Lundagård had no signs of the 
Nordic Idea, even though the editorial board argued in the aftermath that the initial purpose of 
the article had been to show support of Seip. It can be argued though that the student union’s 
decision to dismiss the editorial board was a demonstration of that the student union 
supported Rector Seip. 
Finally, the differences amongst the student papers were clear, with Ergo being the 
strongest advocate for supporting the Norwegian students and rector. Amongst the daily 
newspapers it is better to speak of a similarity, since the newspapers did not comment upon 
the dissolution of DNS, but did comment upon the arrest of the rector. Therefore, the 
differences between the student papers and daily newspapers were that the student papers 
commented upon both events, whereas the daily newspapers joined in when Rector Seip was 
arrested.   
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Chapter 4: «With Concern and Indignation – Norway and We»
128
   
May 1942 – October 1943.  
This chapter will look at two protests at the University of Oslo that took place in 
February and September 1943. The February protest letter was an initiative from the students, 
and the one in September 1943, a statement from the professors. The Swedish students did not 
react to these events, and finding the reasons for this is of interest.
129
 Why did the Swedish 
students not react to these events, and it is of interest to find the reason for this. Why did the 
Swedish students’ not react to these events, when the daily newspapers did? It will be argued 
throughout the chapter that the lack of reaction from the Swedish students was out of the 
ordinary, and to demonstrate this an analysis of the Swedish students’ letter of protest in May 
1942 in relation to the conflict between NS and the Norwegian clergy and teachers, has been 
included.  
The protest in May 1942 was the most powerful protest in which the students had 
created, due to it being a cooperation between the Lund University, Uppsala University, 
Gothenburg University, Stockholm University College and the Agricultural University 
College. Was this protest based on the Nordic Idea? What had occurred between May 1942 
and February 1943 that made the Swedish students not react to the Norwegian students 
protest? Is it possible to talk of a change in the Swedish students view of the Norwegian 
academics? Or was the lack of reaction, a response to the Swedish government’s relations 
with the Norwegian government in London and the German government in Berlin? If these 
relations had an impact, why did the daily newspapers report about the events at the 
University of Oslo? Did the daily newspapers report about the events because of the pro-
Norwegian opposition in Sweden? 
It will be argued in subchapter 4.3 that the silence in September 1943 was out of the 
ordinary, since the Swedish students reacted to the events in Denmark and the arrival of 
Danish students in Sweden. How did the daily newspapers write about the letter of protest by 
the Norwegian professors? 
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4.1 A protest against the violations in Norway  
In May 1942 the student unions at Uppsala -, Lund -, and Gothenburg University, as well as 
Stockholm University College and the Agricultural University College published a letter of 
protest which demonstrated the solidarity of the Swedish students  with the Norwegian 
students and culture bearing professions.
130
   
It is with great concern and indignation that we see how the regime in Norway, which 
is lacking any form of resonance with the Norwegian population, is step by step, 
destroying the basic values that have made the Nordic countries nations of culture. 
Especially, we will as students direct a protest towards the dissolution of the cultural 
life in Norway, which is demonstrated by the abuse towards representatives of church, 
school and university. It is our belief that a political system that praises brutality over 
culture, will not be able to create a future for its people.
131
  
Interestingly, the regime the students protested against was not the Germans, but the 
regime of NS. At an Uppsala Student Union meeting in April 1942 it had been stressed that 
the protest was to be directed towards Quisling, and not against the German occupational 
force.
132
 The student union hoped that «the remaining unions will agree with this 
statement».
133
  Why did the Swedish students direct their protest towards NS instead of the 
Germans? NS and Quisling were the aggravators in the conflict in Norway that emerged in 
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1942, and as seen with the arrest of Rector Seip in September 1941, the Swedish students 
were well informed about any events taking place in Norway. Even if this had not been the 
case in September 1940, it seems as the students were concerned with getting the details 
correct concerning the occupation of Norway. That the student newspapers were not afraid to 
protest against NS is in accordance with Schive’s argument from Chapter 3, that the Germans 
did not react on criticism directed towards NS. The student newspapers had found a way to 
support its Norwegian colleagues without making the Germans question Sweden’s neutrality.  
In Chapter 3 it was mentioned that there were several issues that hindered the 
cooperation between the Swedish government and the Norwegian exile government. These 
issues were still hindering any cooperation between the two governments’ in May 1942. First, 
it was the continuing transit of German soldiers through Sweden. Secondly, it was the issue of 
Finland entering the war with Germany in June 1941, and the Norwegian exile government’s 
decision to end any future cooperation with the country. Finally, the unsolved matter of the 
Norwegian ships in Gothenburg, and the continuing question of diplomatic representation was 
still unresolved by the beginning of 1942. The two government’s had different ideas about the 
future of Europe and the North in case of a peace. The Swedish government wanted to restore 
the status-quo of the pre-war North, and a better cooperation between the Nordic countries. 
The Norwegian exile government, on the other hand, wanted to seek better relations with the 
western countries, i.e. Great Britain and United States of America.
134
 However, it appears as 
the Swedish students were not affected by these relations, because it seems as they were 
rather occupied with demonstrating their support of the Norwegian population. That the 
students had mentioned the cultural life can be brought back to the idea that Norway and 
Sweden was sharing a common culture. This demonstrates that even if the relationship 
between the Swedish government and the Norwegian exile government was at a standstill, the 
Swedish students viewed the relationship between Norway and Sweden as highly important. 
This was why the Swedish students showed their discontent when learning that T.T had 
removed the mentioning of the Norwegian regime’s destruction of the Nordic from the protest 
it sent to the daily newspapers.  
Gaudeamus argued «when the students has finally made a protest it is the duty of the 
newspapers news agency to publish the correct wording of the protest».
135
 Further, it was 
argued that there had been no reason for the news agency to leave out parts of the protest. 
Gaudeamus reasoned «when it comes to such a protest, which has been signed by a great 
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number of names, it is of importance that the entire protest is included, or the meaning can be 
misunderstood».
136
  The meaning of the protest was, however, not misunderstood, because 
shortly after the protest, Dagens Nyheter stated that the protest was speaking on behalf of the 
entire Swedish population. The newspaper continued «Now that trade unionists, teachers, the 
clergy and academics are on the same page, the circle is closed with strong Swedish iron».
137
 
It can therefore be reasoned that T.T was not on accord with the rest of the population when 
leaving out parts of the protest. It is likely that the news agency was following the Swedish 
government’s encouragement to not criticise the warfare of any foreign governments, or to 
bring into question Sweden’s neutrality.  
Even though the students were still careful in how they worded their protest and who 
they directed it to, it was the most powerful and coincided protest made by any academic up 
until then. As Sverker Oredsson argues «by May 1942, the Swedish students had left the 
careful politics of the Swedish government».
138
  It is therefore interesting that the students in 
Sweden did not show the Norwegian students any support when they protested against NS’s 
Labour Mobilisation in February 1943.  
This subchapter has looked at the Swedish students protest letter to NS’s violation of 
the cultural bearers in Norway. It was a protest letter that had been created by five of the 
major educational institutions in Sweden. The daily newspapers were criticised when they had 
left out parts of the protest. In the following subchapter it will demonstrated that the Swedish 
students were quiet when the Norwegian students protested against NS’s Labour 
Mobilisation.  
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4.2 The Norwegian students take a stand against NS’s Labour Mobilisation  
The press have portrayed the (Norwegian) student population as supporters of the 
Norwegian Studentsambandet. It is therefore my duty to make known that I do not 
recognise the Norwegian Student Association as a representative for the student 
population.
139
 
This statement was signed by approximately 2600 students at the University of Oslo in 
February 1943. The prelude to this statement had begun with Adolf Hitler’s demand for a 
total labour mobilisation in both Germany and the occupied countries. On February 22, 1943, 
Quisling followed suit by announcing the introduction of a new law stating that all men 
between the age of 17 and 55, and women between the age of 17 and 35 were to serve the 
German warfare through work service. Only State Officials and a few other groups, such as 
doctors, and pregnant women and women with young children, were excepted from the work 
service.
140
  
On February 23 the students of the University of Oslo were asked to attend a meeting 
at the Assembly Hall concerning the Labour Mobilisation. The students were concerned about 
the effect the labour mobilisation would have on their studies. At the meeting, 
Studentsambandets office manager Carl Martin Kramer, proposed that the students would 
collect firewood for the university, thereby avoiding being sent home to complete the required 
labour.
141
 The students who supported the proposal were asked to stand up, and as almost 
everyone did, Kramer considered the meeting a success. Jorunn Sem Fure argues that Kramer 
had expected that the students would support his proposal, and had therefore arranged for a 
press conference.
142
  
Kramer had, however, forseen the massive reaction from the student population who 
suffered negative publicity because of this press conference. In the days after the meeting the 
Norwegian population could read in Aftenposten, a daily newspaper in Oslo, that the students 
at the university through their support of Studentersambandet had finally stopped resisting the 
occupational regime. The students’ immediate reaction to this bad publicity was to stay away 
from the university, but they soon felt the need to express their feelings more vocally; only 
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days after the meeting at the Assembly Hall, 2600 individual, but identical letters of protests 
were delivered to the university’s secretaries.143 When the exact rules concerning the Labour 
Mobilisation were announced, the students realised they would not be the first to be 
conscripted, but the damage was already done; the Norwegian students had made their most 
powerful protest ever. Yet, the Swedish students did not show the Norwegian students any 
form of support. Why did the Swedish students newspapers not mention the protest?  
There is no exact answer to why the Swedish students did not mention the protest. It 
has not been possible to find any meeting records or articles concerning this letter of protest at 
any of the student unions used in this analysis. Such documents could have explained why the 
Swedish students chose not to react to such an important event at the University of Oslo, and 
the absence of such documents makes a conclusion much more difficult to reach. Considering 
that the Swedish students had mounted their own protest in reaction to the Norwegian 
grievances in May 1942, one would think that they would support the Norwegian students 
again in February 1943. By then the relations between the Swedish and the Norwegian exile 
government had started to thaw, while in May 1942 the governments had been at a standstill. 
It is interesting to note that the Swedish students chose to protest when relations between the 
two governments were bad and refrained from protesting when the relations had improved. 
The reason for this can be found in the fact that the Swedish government was under from both 
the Allies and the pro-Norwegian opposition in Sweden to end the transportation of soldiers to 
Norway, as well as the iron-ore supply that were sent to Germany.
 144
 That there was someone 
else to fight for the Norwegians and put pressure on the Swedish government, could be the 
reason why the Swedish students put down their arms.  
This, however, does not sufficiently explain why the Swedish students chose not to 
show the Norwegian students support. Earlier in the war, the Swedish students had responded 
and made statements regardless of the state of relations between the Swedish government and 
the Norwegian government. Nor had they been stopped by the threat of imminent German 
invasion. In February 1943 the fear of a German invasion was nowhere near what it had been 
in 1940. The Germans had recently experienced big setbacks: first with the battle of El 
Alamein in the summer of 1942, then the surrender at Stalingrad in February 1943. The 
Swedish government then allowed itself to become stricter in their relations with its neighbour 
in the south. In April 1943, the Swedish government could report that the transportation of 
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German soldiers through Sweden had been reduced by 30-40% compared with April 1942. 
The Swedish government had also started to evaluate how the Swedish-German relations had 
been damaging the Swedish neutrality.
145
 This meant that there was no reason for the Swedish 
students to feel that they would oppose their government if they showed the Norwegian 
students support. Was the lack of reaction from the student unions a way to prevent that the 
student newspapers were filled with articles that could bring Sweden’s neutrality in to 
question?  
For the Swedish student population, politics were a unification of the larger events in 
the war and matters that touched the future relations between the Nordic countries. This was 
probably because the students had seen that the progress of the war could influence the 
relations between the Nordic countries.
146
 This can be demonstrated by a few comments made 
in the three student papers. Paul Lindblom, a student at Lund University, argued in Lundagård 
in December 1941 that «Students are – or should at least be – opinion formers».147 Lindblom 
continued to reason that since Finnish, Norwegian and Danish students had played a part in 
shaping the student newspaper Lundagård, it was only natural to write about politics. 
Lindblom found it difficult to accept that the student newspaper were to focus solely on 
academics when Europe was at war.
148
 Law student Igor Holmstedt  argued in Ergo that the 
major questions of the war were of interest everyone, and especially «when it touches our 
inner and outer freedom, our peoples’ survival and the future of the Nordic countries».149 In 
March 1942, editor of Lundagård, Håkan Strömberg stated that «the majority of the student 
population feels that a student newspaper should be un-political, and that it should only focus 
on questions of studies», and further on «Yet, with the many events occurring out in the 
world, no academic can stand indifferent to these matters».
150
 It is difficult to argue that it was 
a wish to avoid discussing politics that held the students from mentioning the February 
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protest, because the students had already established their position in relation to Norway and 
the Norwegian students with the protests of September 1940, September 1941 and May 1942. 
This is clear when reading Gaudeamus from March 1943, where it was stated that the Nordic 
countries must «through our historic traditions and academic commitments, with the help of 
the truth and the law, work for a free and unified North».
151
 There is no clear answer to why 
the Swedish students did not react in February 1943, but in light of their reactions to the 
events of May 1942 it was clearly atypical. Why then, did the daily newspapers mention the 
Norwegian students’ protest?  
The reports written by Dagens Nyheter and GHT about the events in Oslo were short, 
and contained only the basic details about what had occurred in Oslo: that the Norwegian 
students had been asked to attend a meeting at the Assembly Hall, that they had been asked to 
support Kramer’s suggestion, and that the outcome of the meeting was that the students had 
protested. The reason for why they wrote about the protest can be linked to the pro-
Norwegian opposition’s interest in the transportation of German soldiers through Sweden; one 
could argue that by writing about the events in Oslo, the newspapers were trying to make their 
own government aware of the Norwegian population’s hardship so that they would end the 
soldier transport.
152
 This argument is based on the turn in Dagens Nyheter stand against the 
Swedish government’s submissive politics towards the German government. By 1943 Dagens 
Nyheter had with GHT become one of a few daily newspapers that were critical to the 
Swedish government’s resilient politics towards Germany, and in particular the transportation 
of German soldiers through Sweden.
153
  
Did Arbetet support the pro-Norwegian opposition? It is difficult to conclude whether 
the newspaper actually did support it, because of the editor’s position in the Social-
Democrats. Yet, it is possible that indirectly Arbetet wanted to help the opposition, because 
the newspaper’s article differed from the other two newspapers articles, because it was filled 
with more details about events taking place after the protest, and understanding for why the 
students had protested. Can it be reasoned that the newspaper had a journalist in Norway, and 
had not just used T.T’s article? It has not been possible to verify this, but compared to the 
other two newspapers articles, the discussion around the event is more detailed in Arbetet. 
The newspaper was the only paper that mentioned that Kramer had posted a placard that 
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urged the students to withdraw their protest.
154
 Kramer did put up a placard, which 
demonstrates how well informed the newspaper was, and can only create a debate of whether 
the newspaper had someone in Oslo to experience the events firsthand or not. The newspaper 
could further on report that it was impossible to know the consequences the students would 
face if they did not revoke their protests. The consequences of the letter of protest were that 
the State Police seized the protests and four students at the philological study hall was arrested 
and sentenced to six months in prison.
155
 The University of Oslo suffered arrests, dismantling 
of both DNS and the Collegiums of Deans and now a protest from the students, and the 
Swedish students had responded every time up until the student protest. The Swedish students 
would continue to keep quiet as the professors of the University of Oslo protested in October 
1943. However, this could have been caused by the influx of Danish students to Sweden the 
same month.   
In this subchapter it has been looked at the Swedish students quietness in relation to 
the Norwegian students letter of protest in February 1943. It has not been possible to make a 
conclusion upon why the Swedish students did not react, since it has not been possible to find 
any primary sources upon why they did not react. It was demonstrated that the daily 
newspapers commented the protest, and it was argued that this could have been because of the 
newspapers wish make the Swedish government more aware about the German violations in 
Norway. In the following subchapter it will be demonstrated that the Swedish students 
continued to keep quiet in relation to a protest made by the Norwegian professors in 
September 1943.  
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4.3 The Norwegian professors take a stand against NS’s intervention in the 
admission process at the University of Oslo  
In September 1943, the Norwegian professors followed in the footsteps of their students and 
protested against NS’s intervention in the university’s admission procedure. This protest 
would produce a different outcome than the students’ protest in February: ten professors and 
sixty-three students were arrested.  
NS had shown interest in the admission procedure at the Medical Faculty in 1940, but 
it was not until January 1942 that they actually introduced a rule that stating that the 
Department of Church and Education could admit students into the medicine program without 
the faculty’s consent.156 This became a conflict at the university throughout 1942, and by 
1943 the relationship between NS and the university was tense.
157
 By January 1943 Adolf 
Hoel, the former pro-rector, had officially become rector of the university. The Dean at 
Medicin Faculty, Georg Monrad-Krohn had hoped that by Hoel becoming rector, it would 
stop Skancke’s many interventions at the university.158 and even though the minister’s 
interventions at the institution were reduced, the university had to deal with a new threat to 
the institutions independence; its rector. During the summer of 1943, the new Rector took the 
initiative to change the admission regulations. These changes were to benefit students that had 
taken their examen artium as private candidates due to difficult circumstances and students 
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from the three northernmost counties.
159
 The new regulations stated as well that the rector, not 
the faculties, was to decide who were to be admitted. Sem Fure argues that after two years as 
pro-Rector Hoel should have known that making a change to the regulations without the 
faculties knowledge would not be well received by the employees at the university, and that 
such a change would be viewed as just another way for NS to get their loyal students enrolled 
at programs it was difficult to get accepted to.
160
  
The reactions from the Faculties were twofold. First, Monrad-Krohn and Halvor 
Solberg, the Dean of the Mathematical and Science Faculty, made known to Hoel, even 
before the changes had reached the faculties, that the new regulations were unacceptable. The 
second reaction came from the illegal Aksjonsutvalget (the Action Committee), a secret group 
consisting of professors with links to all five Faculties at the university, and aiming with any 
means necessary to hinder NS and the German occupational force from taking over the 
university.
161
 The majority of the Deans would never have approved of the Committee if they 
had been aware of it, because the Committee had close links to Hjemmefronten, the 
Norwegian resistance movement. Hjemmefronten wanted action instead of negotiation, 
whereas Monrad-Krohn sought to negotiate before acting. Finally, the Deans wanted to attract 
as little attention as possible on the on-goings at the university, whereas the Committee were 
would rather have a closed university than a conquered one.
162
  
The Committee succeeded in its efforts to make the professors act and not negotiate 
with NS or the occupational force, because on September 14, a letter of protest was sent to the 
Church and Education Department.
163
 This protest stated that the professors could not accept 
the new regulations because it was feared that the Rector would hinder more academically 
qualified students to be admitted in his eagerness to help students in need. Further on it was 
argued that the new regulations would hinder the university from being an institution based on 
free research and open lectures. As a result, minister Skancke was summoned to attend a 
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meeting at the Reich Commissariat, where the Commissariat informed the minister that if the 
new regulations were not introduced, the lack of action had to be viewed as sabotage, and 
Terboven would be informed about the conflict at the university.
164
 Minister Skancke had no 
other option than to summon the Deans and question them about the meaning of the letter of 
protest and whether the professors would go on strike if the new regulations were introduced. 
To hinder both a strike and a German intervention at the university, the Faculties were asked 
to come up with a suggestion for regulations that would better suit the Faculties. This 
overruling of Hoel’s decisions was not well received by Quisling, who demanded that the new 
regulations be forcefully introduced. When they were not, Quisling ordered the arrest of ten 
employees and sixty-three students on October 15. The reactions from Sweden came from the 
daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter and not the Swedish students.  
On October 17 Dagens Nyheter could report that eight professors and approximately 
forty students had been arrested.
165
 It was a detailed article where every aspect about the 
prelude to the arrests and the actual arrests were discussed, and included in this discussion the 
newspaper stated that «the State Police’s action towards the university is due to an inner 
conflict between the moderate and aggressive wings in NS».
166
 What did Dagens Nyheter 
mean with these wings in NS, and who belonged to them? In Chapter 2 it was mentioned that 
the nationalistic ideology had held a hegemony in the politics within NS since the party was 
founded in 1933, but that with the German invasion in 1940, a pangermanism that argued for 
a unification with German got a more influential position within NS. By 1943 NS was split in 
two: an aggressive pangermanist wing and a more moderate nationalistic wing. It is feasible 
that Dagens Nyheter meant these two wings within NS, especially when keeping in mind that 
Rector Hoel was linked to the moderate wing.
167
 The newspaper reported that the moderate 
wing had tried to listen to the ideas that the professors had presented in relation to the new 
regulations, whereas the aggressive wing had no wish to do so. Adolf Hoel had tried to listen 
                                                 
164
 The Reich Commissariat consisted of three departments that were subjected to Terboven’s power. The 
complex organisational conditions in Hitler’s Germany would be reflected in Terboven’s Norway, but still 
Terboven tried to make a clean organisational Commissariat. The Administrative department was led by Hans 
Reinhard Koch, the Press and Propaganda department was led by Georg Wilhelm Müller, and the Industry 
department was led by  Carlo Otte. When Terboven was not able to attend a meeting the leaders of the 
departments would represent the Reich Commissar. That the Reich Commissariat did not inform Quisling about 
this meeting, gives an indication that the Commissariat held the final power in Norway. Nøkleby, Josef 
Terboven: Hitlers mann i Norge, 116-117.  
165
 ”Åtta professorer, 40 studenter häktade i Oslo”, Dagens Nyheter, No.282, 17 October 1943.  
166
 ”Inre strid innom N.S. föregick aktionen”, Dagens Nyheter, No.282, 17 October 1943.  
167
 ’Åtta professorer, 40 studenter häktade i Oslo, Dagens Nyheter, No.282, 17 October 1943.  
 58 
 
to the ideas presented by the faculties, but that this was fruitless when Quisling had made the 
arrest of the students and professors. Was Quisling therefore the aggressive part of NS? 
Interestingly, Dagens Nyheter had no mentioning about who the newspaper believed 
to belong to the aggressive part of NS. Quisling had embraced the ideas of pangermanism, but 
he was no promoter of the idea. Øystein Sørensen argues that there was no immediate 
«leader» of the aggressive wing. The members of NS that could have been viewed as 
promoters of closer links with Germany became in the end supporters of the moderate and 
national wing. Jonas Lie, minister of the Police Department, had from 1940 worked for closer 
relations with Germany, but in 1941, he had demonstrated a lack of strong pangermanistic 
foundations that was needed to be a part of the more aggressive part of NS. Sørensen even 
argues that at the end of the war, Lie showed leanings towards the nationalistic and moderate 
part of the party.
168
 Minister of Justice in the NS government, Sverre Riisnæs had as well 
worked for closer relations with Germany, but his admiration for Quisling hindered him from 
adopting a strong pangermanistic foundation. It is therefore feasible to argue that since 
Dagens Nyheter knew about the inner discussions in NS, the newspaper also knew that there 
was no strong «leader» of the aggressive wing in the party and had therefore some difficulties 
in mentioning anyone by name.  
It is interesting that Dagens Nyheter was able to see that Hoel was a part of the more 
moderate part of the party, since he was not the leader of this wing. Gulbrand Lunde, the 
minister of Department for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, had been the main 
promoter of a nationalistic mindset since 1940, and after his death in October 1942, Rolf 
Jørgen Fuglesang, Cultrual Minister, took over the position as leader of the nationalistic 
wing.
169
 It can be argued that in relation to the events at the University of Oslo it was easy to 
reason that Hoel was a part of the moderate and nationalistic part of the party, but in light of 
the fact that the newspaper had not been informed about the rectors own part in the new 
regulations, questions are raised whether the wording of the article would have been different 
if the newspaper had been informed about this. Even the British Intelligence had been able to 
pick up on Hoel’s position within the party: «’Professor Hoel, the head of the university and a 
moderate element in the party, desires a peaceful solution, while the extremists wish to close 
the university entirely’».170 Would Hoel still have been a part of the moderate part of NS since 
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he tried to work with the professors and not against them, or would he have been situated 
amongst the more aggressive? In light of the newspaper’s unwillingness to mention by name 
the individuals that belonged to the more aggressive part of NS, it is likely that if Hoel was 
seen as aggressive, there would not have been any mentioning of his role in creating the new 
regulations.  
It is clear that the Dagens Nyheter were aware of the part in which NS played in the 
events at the University of Oslo, and that the daily newspapers was well informed about the 
inner conflict in NS. It is possible that this can be credited to the newspaper’s position as a 
pro-Norwegian newspaper, but it can also be reasoned that Dagens Nyheter’s willingness to 
report about this conflict within NS demonstrates that the Swedish press felt freer to criticise 
Germany warfare because of said country’s weakened position in the war. By September 
1943 the Swedish government had taken a clear stand against Berlin by cancelling the 
transportation of German soldiers through Sweden.
171
 During the autumn of 1943, a 
Norwegian police troop, which would take charge in case of a German surrender, was 
established in Sweden. This willingness from the Swedish government to help the 
Norwegians, meant that the relationship between the Swedish government and the Norwegian  
exile government grew stronger. Considering the great improvement in relations between 
Sweden and the Norwegian exile government, as well as Germany’s weakening position in 
the war, it is highly interesting that the Swedish students did not mention the Norwegian 
professors’ protest; a response from the Swedish might not have provoked any reactions from 
Germany, but would perhaps have been praised by the Norwegians. Still, no comment was 
made, and the possible reason was the influx of the Danish students in Sweden from October 
1943. 
In this subchapter it has been demonstrated that the Swedish students continued to be 
quiet in relation to the events occurring at the University of Oslo. It was also made clear that 
Dagens Nyheter was aware of the inner conflicts in NS. In the following subchapter it will be 
made known that the influx of the Danish students in October 1943 made the Swedish 
students not comment upon the letter of protest from the Norwegian professors.  
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4.3.1 The influx of Danish students  
On October 16, 1943, Thord Plaenge Jacobsen stated in Ergo that «it is admirable that the 
Danish population are able to, even when the Danish ideals are militarised, to be irrevocable 
in their determination for a peaceful living».
172
 What Jacobsen meant by the Danish ideals 
being militarised is not explained, but it is likely that it was a reference to how the German 
occupation had turned the Danish society from an open and free society, to a closed and 
militarised one. This statement was made after a series of sabotages and strikes had occurred 
all over Denmark.  
On August 7, 1943 a state of emergency was declared in Esjberg, a city located on the 
west coast of Jylland. This state of emergency was a result of several acts of sabotage and 
collisions between Danish citizens and German soldiers, and was supposed to show the 
workers what would happen if they opposed the occupational force.
 173
 However, the Germans 
were not prepared for the Danish workers’ reaction to the state of emergency. The workers 
went into an immediate strike, which did not end before the Germans lifted the state of 
emergency on August 12.
174
 The civil unrest was, however, not over, because on August 15 
and 16, several workers went into strike in Odense, a city situated on the island Funen in 
Southern Denmark. Several workers were hurt and a German officer killed, and even though a 
settlement was reached between the workers and the occupational force, it was only the 
beginning of what would turn out to be a series of strikes. The next strike occurred in 
Aalborg, and spread out to cities like Fredrikshavn, Skagen and Sæby, all situated in the 
North of Denmark. On August 28
, 
the Germans reacted by urging the Danish government to 
declare the entire country to be in a state of emergency, so as to stop the sabotage.
175
 
However, the Danish government was not willing to succumb to the German demands, and on 
August 29 the parliament and the government disabled themselves.
176
 The Germans were now 
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the only authority in Denmark. As a result, the Danish army was disbanded by the Germans, 
the Danish fleet was sunk by its own crew and several professors from the University of 
Copenhagen were arrested. 
 
It has been difficult to obtain any secondary sources that can explain why the 
professors were arrested, but it is possible that they, as their Norwegian counterparts, reacted 
to the violations that the Germans had implemented upon the Danish population. Further, it is 
possible that the Danish professors, as their Norwegian colleagues, had close links to the 
resistance movement and that this was the reason for their arrest in August 1943. This 
argument is strengthened when considering that the Danish students protested strongly against 
the persecution of the Danish Jews in October 1943. This protest gave the Germans a reason 
to make the arrest of professors and students. Throughout October several rumours stated that 
the students would be sent to mandatory work service in Germany.
177
 As a result, the many 
Danish students fled to Sweden.  
Since the invasion of Denmark and Norway, the Swedish students had focused more 
on the severe situation of the Norwegian students than the situation of the Danish students. 
The reason was as Gaudeamus mentioned «for a long time it has been the belief that Denmark 
was to escape the experience which other occupied countries have gone through», but as 
Gaudemaus continued to reason « because of the occupational force continuing nervousness, 
our southern neighbour have come under the reign of terror».
178
 According to Gaudeamus, the 
Danish had played an important role in keeping the Danish public conscience intact. This 
argument was supported by the other student newspapers. In Ergo it was stated that «we 
Swedish students have an sincere admiration for what the Danish students have accomplished 
these last years».
179
 The influence of the Danish students is clearly visible at Uppsala 
University where at a meeting concerning events in Denmark the students decided not to 
comment the Norwegian professors’ protest letter.180  
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In Lundagård and Ergo it is possible to observe some awareness about the significance 
of the influx of the Danish students to Sweden. Lundagård was particularly interested in 
keeping the Danish students in Lund, because they argued «as Uppsala University has become 
the centre for the Norwegian students, Lund University has to become the centre for the 
Danish students».
181
 On October 16 Ergo stated that fractions within Uppsala University were 
trying to get some of the Danish students to Uppsala, with the argument that it was only 
through the fleeing students that the Swedish students could understand the events in 
Denmark.
182
 The reason why both Lundagård and Ergo wanted the Danish students at their 
own university, was the respect these student newspapers held for the battle that the students 
had fought against the German occupation. In Lundagård it was reasoned that the Swedish 
population looked up to the Danish culture because of its mature development.
183
 This 
sentiment was not shared by everyone at Lund University, because on October 15 and 
October 16, Arbetet and GHT could report that a poster had been hung in the vestibule at 
Lund University, protesting against the Danish Jews coming to Sweden.
184
 The poster was 
quickly removed, and on November 9, Lundagård published an article by student Allan 
Ekberg, in which he clearly stated that even though the majority of the students were 
politically indifferent, they disagreed with the poster’s message.185 Interestingly, Ekberg did 
argue in this article that «barely has our country become independent enough that it dares to 
protest regarding to the violation our neighbours are going through...».
186
 This demonstrates 
that at least Ekberg was aware that the Swedish government, and consequently the Swedish 
people, were now freer to respond to any German violations in occupied countries. This 
feeling of freedom is clearly demonstrated in Gaudeamus’ choice to write that it was the 
Germans who had committed the violations against the Danish students.
187
 Such an outspoken 
reaction had not occurred since the responses against the arrest of Rector Seip in September 
1941, and was a clear sign of the changes that had occurred in Sweden during 1943.  
Was the Nordic Idea present in how the Swedish students viewed and described the 
events in Denmark? As mentioned above, that the two student newspapers Lundagård and 
Ergo wrote about the respect and admiration the Swedish students had for their colleagues in 
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Denmark. It can be argued that this admiration came from the long traditions the two 
countries had of working for better connections between the Nordic countries, first through 
Scandinavism and later through the Nordic Idea. In Chapter 2, it was stated that it was easier 
for Denmark and Sweden to work for these ideas, while Norway for long periods opposed any 
cooperation with its neighbouring countries. It is clear that the long relationship between the 
Sweden and Denmark heavily influenced the way the Swedish students wrote about the 
Danish students’ protests. The way in which they wrote about the Danish students showed 
that the Swedish students had waited for a chance to write about their colleagues in Denmark. 
As a consequence of the increased attention the Swedish students gave Denmark was that the 
Norwegian professors’ protest letter was left out. It would, however, not be long before the 
Norwegian students and professors had regained the attention of the Swedish students; on 
November 30, 1943, the University of Oslo was closed.  
In this subchapter it was demonstrated that the reason for why the Swedish students 
did not comment upon the letter of protest from the Norwegian professors, was because of the 
influx of Danish students in Sweden from October 1943.  
 
4.4 Summary  
The main argument of this chapter has been that the Swedish students lack of reaction to the 
Norwegian students protest letter in February 1943 and the Norwegian professors protest 
letter was out of the ordinary. This argument was made after the examination of the Swedish 
students reactions in both May 1942 to the conflict between NS and the Norwegian clergy and 
teachers, and in October 1943 when the students supported the Danish students.  
The protest in May 1942 was a protest against NS and not the Germans, which can 
demonstrate how well informed the Swedish students were about the events in Oslo. The 
protest was the first sign that the students were moving away from the government’s careful 
politics, because by protesting against NS the students were protesting against the German 
occupational force in Norway. This went against the Swedish government’s encouragement to 
protect Sweden’s neutrality.   
It could have been possible to argue that the Swedish students’ were protecting 
Sweden’s neutrality in February 1943 when they did not react to the Norwegian students 
protest letter. Yet, the relationship between the Swedish and Norwegian governments had 
started to thaw by February and the immediate threat of an German invasion had diminished.  
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Dagens Nyheter and GHT’s articles about the protest by the Norwegian students were 
short but detailed. It was argued that this might have had something to do with the newspapers 
support of the pro-Norwegian opposition’s pressure on the Swedish government to end the 
transit of  German soldiers through Sweden. If Arbetet wanted to help the pro-Norwegian 
opposition, is difficult to say, since its editor was a part of the Social-Democratic party. Yet, 
as it was mentioned in Chapter 1, the newspaper did change its perspective on the war in 
1942/1943, and it can therefore be reasoned that through its detailed article, the newspaper 
wanted to indirectly help the opposition. It was also, argued that Arbetet most likely had a 
reporter in Oslo, because of the details the newspaper had about the events. 
 Dagens Nyheter was the only daily newspaper that mentioned the protest in 
September in 1943. Interestingly, the newspaper had a conclusion to why the arrests had taken 
place; the inner conflicts in NS. It was concluded by the newspaper that Hoel was a part of the 
moderate wing, which was interesting since Hoel was not the “leader” of the moderate wing 
within NS. No name was mentioned in connection with the aggressive wing, which was 
argued to have been because there was no immediate leader of this wing. 
The Swedish students did not mention the Norwegian professors protest, which was 
due to the arrival of the Danish students in Sweden. It was argued in subchapter 4.3.1 that the 
Swedish students had hoped that Denmark would survive the war without coming under any 
form of reign of terror. Yet, since Denmark did at the end of August the Swedish students 
expressed their respect and solidarity with the Danish students. It was also argued that the 
presence of the Nordic Idea in the Swedish students articles, they had perhaps waited for a 
chance to demonstrate their support for the Danish students. 
The Nordic Idea was present in the Swedish students protest in May 1942. It was also 
a  testimony of how the Swedish students felt about the Norwegian population. It is, however, 
difficult to argue that the Nordic Idea was present amongst the Swedish students in February 
1943 and September 1943, since there was no reaction to the protests. Yet, with the reactions 
in connection with the influx of the Danish students in Sweden, it can be argued that the 
Swedish students had not abandoned the ideas of the Nordic Idea behind. The Nordic Idea 
was present in the daily newspapers through the pro-Norwegian opposition.  
The differences between the daily newspapers and student newspapers are clear in this 
chapter. Whereas the daily newspapers mentioned both the Norwegian students protest in 
February 1943 and the Norwegian professors protest in September 1943, the student 
newspapers did not.  
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Chapter 5: «The Norwegian students cause is our cause»
188
  
November 1943- January 1944. 
This chapter will focus on the reactions of the Swedish students, the daily newspapers and the 
Swedish government upon learning that the German occupational force had closed the 
University of Oslo on November 30, 1943, and arrested its students, professors and lecturers. 
The chapter has been divided into three main parts: the reason for these events, the reactions 
to them, and the consequences.  
Part two, concerning the reactions, will itself be divided into three: the Swedish 
government’s appeal to the German government in Berlin, the reactions of the daily 
newspapers, and finally the reactions of the Swedish academics. The aim is to see how these 
three institutions of Swedish society may influenced each other. How was the Swedish 
government’s appeal to Berlin received by its population? Did the government, as the highest 
political instance in Sweden influence whose/which reactions the Swedish newspapers could 
report on? What were the reactions from the Norwegian exile government to the Swedish 
appeal to Berlin, and even more importantly, how did the Norwegian exile government react 
when the Swedish government withdrew its appeal and stated that no measures were to be 
taken against Germany? Also, can an examination of the daily newspapers reveal why the 
Swedish population felt so strongly about the closing of the University of Oslo? Did the 
government and the daily newspapers influence the Swedish academics’ reactions to the 
arrests, or was the academics reaction a testimony to the old relationship between the 
university institutions of Norway and Sweden? How were the reactions received by the 
Norwegian students? And finally, regarding all three reactions and protests: Was the Nordic 
Idea the driving force behind these protests and reactions? How did the Nordic Idea manifest 
itself?   
The third part, concerning the consequences, will look at the result of these reactions, 
namely the cancellation of the Swedish-German cultural connections. This issue became 
important for the Swedish students, but even the daily newspapers would view this as an 
important issue. How did the Swedish students defend their decision to end these 
connections? Was the Nordic Idea the motivation behind the decision? And how did the daily 
newspapers, other Swedish students, and students in Great Britain and USA react?  
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5.1 The University of Oslo is closed 
The many conflicts that had occurred at the University of Oslo during the occupation 
culminated with the students being blamed for the fire that had erupted in the university’s 
Assembly Hall during the night of November 28, 1943.
189
 On November 29, Reich 
Commissar Terboven informed the leader of the German Sicherheitsdienst in Norway, 
Herbert Noot, and the leader of the Sicherheitspolizei (SIPo) in Norway, Heinrich Fehlis, how 
he planned to resolve the conflict at the university. The Reich Commissar’s plan was to order 
the arrest of the students at the University of Oslo and the University College of Trondheim, 
excepting loyal students and females. The two German officials were able to change 
Terboven’s mind about the students in Trondheim, but he was adamant about arresting the 
students in Oslo. It was decided they would act the next day, November 30. The reason for 
their hurry was the wish to stop students or individuals connected to them from being tipped 
off.  Even the Ministerial President Quisling and minister Skancke were informed of the plan 
only hours before it was implemented. Quisling had no objections to the plan, because, as 
Sem Fure argues, «he had already used the State Police against the university and had shown 
great resentment towards the institution».
190
 Minister Skancke had failed in his university 
politics, and therefore had no authority to oppose the German decision. Gestapo was given the 
main responsibility for the arrest and the interrogations, but due to the high number of 
arrestees it became necessary to use the Wehrmacht’s material and personnel. 300 men and 
several trucks were prepared for the arrests due to take place the next day at 11.00 a.m.  
Despite Terboven’s efforts to keep the plans a secret, the Wehrmachts transport leader, 
Lieutenant Colonel Theodor Stelzer informed Arvid Brodersen, a Research Fellow at the 
university, with connections both to the resistance movement and the university, about the 
impending arrests. Stelzer belonged to a circle of officers that conspired against Hitler, and 
played a key role in the failed assassination attempt on the Führer on July 20, 1944. Stelzer’s 
tip allowed, Brodersen to contact other students to discuss how best to inform the student 
population and when to do it. The timing was crucial, as informing the students too early 
might make them believe the warning to be a false alarm and return to the university.
191
 It was 
decided not to inform the students of the exact time of the arrest, as the leaking of such 
                                                 
189
 Note: Historians have to date not been able to figure out who set the Assembly Hall on fire. The Germans 
blamed it on Communistic elements, whereas NS oriented newspapers blamed the students at the University of 
Oslo. Others argued that it had been the German occupational force that had set the Hall on fire so as to have a 
reason to persecute political fractions within the Norwegian society. Sem Fure, Universitetet i kamp, 263-265.  
190
 Sem Fure, Universitetet i kamp, 266 
191
 Ibid, 268. 
 67 
 
precise information might imperil Stelzer. Another difficulty was the fact that the Faculties 
were spread all over Oslo, making it difficult to inform all the students. Further, many 
students had seminars, exams or clinical studies, which prevented them leaving the 
university’s premises. The law students, who were in the middle of an exam when the rest of 
the student population was informed, were arrested. Many other students were arrested 
because they lingered too close to the university buildings as the Gestapo surrounded the 
university grounds.  
5.2 the immediate reactions from the Swedish population  
 
5.2.1 The Swedish government takes a stand  
The Swedish reactions to the events of November 30, 1943, exceeded any previous Swedish 
response to wartime violations at the University of Oslo. When they were notified about the 
closing of the University of Oslo, the rectors from Uppsala University, Lund University and 
Stockholm University College immediately conferred with each other over the telephone on 
how to react to the news.
192
 The outcome of this telephone call was that the Rector of Uppsala 
University and the President of Svenska Föreande Studentkårer (Swedish United Student 
Unions) met with the Swedish Prime Minister, Per Albin Hansson, in order to make him 
aware of where the academics stood on the issue. Aftonbladet, a governmental oriented daily 
newspaper, reported that the meeting had lasted for half an hour, but that it was not known 
how the Prime Minister had viewed the statement of the academics, or what promises he had 
given them.
193
 However, the academics must have influenced the Foreign Minister, Christian 
Günther, because on December 2, he sent an appeal to the German minister in Stockholm: 
The Swedish government have been notified about the measures that has been carried 
out towards students and teachers at the University of Oslo. The government is hoping 
that the process will be stopped. Especially the intention of sending the students out of 
Norway. In the best interest of the future relationship between Sweden and Germany, 
the Swedish government is appealing to the German government to succumb to the 
Swedish population’s wishes.194 
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The Swedish government’s initiative was well received by both the Swedish 
population and the Norwegian exile government. The city of  Gävle sent its support to the 
government, stating that they were pleased with the government’s reactions towards the 
arrests in Oslo.
195
 At a protest meeting that attracted 12.000 Swedes in Linköping, it was 
stated that «We, the citizens have no other choice than to make our government understand 
that we are willing to suffer to the restrictions that might come if the trade relations are broken 
with Germany».
196
 Clearly, the Swedish population had waited for their government to take a 
stand against Germany, and when they finally did, the people’s support was profound. Yet, no 
one was more appreciative of this statement than the Norwegian exile government.  
On December 6, 1943 Arbetet included a speech held in London by Education 
Minister Nils Hjelmtveit of the Norwegian exile government. The minister spoke of the 
Swedish population’s protest against the transgressions at the University of Oslo, and stated 
that «what has now occurred only shows that the feeling of Nordic solidarity and spiritual 
friendship is still present amongst the Nordic countries». However, what pleased him most 
was the fact that their protest against Berlin demonstrated that the Swedish government 
valued Nordic solidarity in cultural questions.
197
 Even the Norwegian resistance movement 
showed its appreciation for the appeal from the Swedish government. «Sweden is with us», 
the resistance movement stated, and they argued that «(...) if Sweden wants friendship and 
unity after the war, it should be made known that this appeal has contributed greatly. The 
Swedes have acted, and it is now for the Germans to decide on the consequences».
198
 The 
reason behind the Norwegian governmental officials’ appreciation of the Swedish 
government’s appeal can be found in the relatively good relationship that had been established 
between the two governments. By December 1943, the Swedish government had ended the 
transportation of German soldiers through Sweden. They had also allowed the establishment 
of a Norwegian police troop in Sweden (though they did not admit this to the Germans) and 
the Norwegian exile government was officially acknowledged through diplomatic 
representation at the Swedish government. But when Germany’s Foreign Minister, Joachim 
von Ribbentrop, answered the Swedish appeal, the Norwegian exile government finally 
understood that the Swedish government would not openly support them until Germany was 
no longer a threat.   
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On December 4, von Ribbentrop informed Stockholm that the German government 
declined the Swedish request for a discussion of the recent violations in Norway. He 
demanded that «the Swedish government (should) refrain from interfering in matters of 
Norwegian-German nature in the future».
199
 This reply was not well received by the Swedes, 
particularly the Prime Minister. Alf W. Johansson argues that the appeal sent of December 2, 
must have been published without Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson’s full knowledge of its 
content, because when discussing whether to respond to von Ribbentrop’s answer, Hansson 
particularly criticised the sentence where the Swedish-German relations had been 
mentioned.
200
 The Prime Minister did not wish to create conflict between Stockholm and 
Berlin, because he did not think such a disagreement would benefit the Norwegian population. 
The Swedish press was expecting the government’s answer to finally establish Sweden’s 
support of the Allies. Yet, the press were disappointed with the Prime Minister’s statement in 
the Social Democrats newspaper Social-Democraten that «Sweden will not take out any 
measures against Germany».
201
 Then why was a reply given on December 17 to Ribbentrop’s 
answer?  
At the end of December 1943 GHT and the pro-Norwegian newspaper Trots Allt! 
reported that the Swedish government had replied to Ribbentrop on December 17.
202
 They 
stated that the government had proclaimed that «the Swedish government cannot accept the 
German argument that it (Swedish government) has no right to intervene on behalf of the 
Norwegian people». Further it was stated that «the development in the Nordic countries, 
countries that Sweden has strong ties to, is not irrelevant to the Swedish government and 
population».
203
 The reply concluded that the arrest of the Norwegian students and professors 
would harm Swedish-German relations. Yet, according to Alf W. Johansson, the Swedish 
government did not discuss the adoption of stricter policies towards Germany until a few 
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months later, and then in relation to other German demands.
204
 Where them did this statement 
come from? Lennart Oldenburg argues that the government had published the article. But 
when keeping in mind the Prime Minister’s unwillingness to answer Ribbentrop, it seems 
likely that the answer of December 17, like Günther’s appeal, had been distributed without 
Hansson’s consent. So, who then within the government might have written this reply? 
During 1943 a slight split in the government had become apparent. Prime Minister Hansson 
and Foreign Minister Günther preferred a pragmatic neutrality lenient toward German 
demands. They were opposed by the Minister of Finance Ernst Wigforrs, the Minister of 
Trade Herman Eriksson and the Social Minister Gustav Möller, who wanted the government 
to adopt a stricter attitude towards Germany.
205
 It is therefore feasible that the statement had 
come from the more radical wing of the government. But why would Günther send an appeal 
to the German government if he supported a pragmatic neutrality? 
Since his inauguration as Foreign Minister in 1939, Günther had been charged with 
both the protection of Swedish-German relations and keeping up with the state affairs in the 
Nordic countries, especially Norway. Most likely, his interest in Norway was due to many 
years spent as the Swedish envoy in Oslo. Protecting the Nordic interests and the Swedish-
German simultaneously was no easy task, and when the fear of a German invasion became 
too strong, his protection of the Nordic interests faltered. It is therefore feasible that Günther’s 
appeal of December 2 was an attempt to repair the Swedish relations with Norway after years 
of neglect. Günther had published his appeal with the best of intentions, but as argued above, 
this appeal had no authority without the Prime Minister’s consent. This development was not 
well received in London. This was demonstrated by Dagens Nyheter on December 14.   
Dagens Nyheter reported that on December 10 a comment about the Swedish 
government’s change of mind had been on London radio. Who had made the comment was 
not amplified, but the comment had argued that the Swedish appeal had increased the 
anticipation of the Allies that the Swedish government would join them, and «bravely and 
finally have put themselves in the company of the nations that have decided to fight against 
tyranny, and slavery oppression».
206
 But, the comment argued, as the Swedish government 
had changed its mind it would have been better if the appeal had never been made, because 
then «the whole world would not have become aware of the Swedish government’s 
                                                 
204
Johansson, Per Albin och kriget, 333. 
205
 Johansson, Per Albin och kriget, 333-334. 
206
 ”Ny Sverigekritik i brittiska radion”, Dagens Nyheter, No.340, 14 December 1943.  
 71 
 
ambiguity».
207
 It is important to note that these negative statements were directed towards the 
government, and not the Swedish population itself. Just a couple of days earlier, Dagens 
Nyheter had reported that a spokesman for the Norwegian exile government announced the 
thankfulness of the Norwegian people to the Swedish population for their support regarding 
the November 30 violations in Oslo.
208
  
In this subchapter it has been looked at how the Swedish Foreign Minister sent an 
appeal to Berlin with the request to stop the deportation of the Norwegian students. The 
answer from the German government was negative, and as a result the Swedish Prime 
Minister refused to take out any measures against the Germans. The reactions from the 
Swedish population and Norwegian exile government was at first positive, but turned negative 
with the Prime Minister’s answer. In the following subchapter the daily newspapers reactions 
will be looked at.  
 
5.2.2 The daily newspapers reactions   
On December 1, the Swedish population could read all about the events which had taken 
place at the University of Oslo the day before. Including the details about the actually arrests, 
which Arbetet also printed, Dagens Nyheter and GHT  could report that the arrested students 
had been held in the Assembly Hall for a few hours before being visited by Wilhelm Rediess, 
leader of both the German SS in Norway and the police force.
209
 The three newspapers stated 
that Rediess had held a speech proclaiming that the arrests had been made because of the 
disobedience the university had showed the German occupational force and NS; the arrests 
were a measure taken to protect the state, and to maintain the peace of the Norwegian 
society.
210
 The inclusion of this speech clearly demonstrates that the daily newspapers were 
well informed, and yet they were unaware that the Reich Commissar Terboven had been 
present. The Reich Commissar had only made a short appearance, but this presence clearly 
indicates the importance of the arrests to the German occupational force in Norway. However, 
Berlin viewed the arrests differently. Upon learning learning about the arrests, German 
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Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels stated that the arrests were « an obvious mistake».
211
 
The Propaganda Minister was clearly concerned that the arrests could damage the relations 
between Germany and Sweden. Berlin was undoubtedly aware of the pro-Norwegian 
opposition in Sweden, and was probably conscious that this opposition would exploit this new 
violation of the Norwegian population. Germany could not afford a hostile Sweden, because 
the German war industry needed the Swedish iron ore. Still the German government had to 
agree with Terboven’s decision. The Swedish population was not pleased.   
In early December the Swedish Authors Association stated that the arrests were a 
«decapitation of the Norwegian people».
212
 On Sunday December 5, a Church meeting was 
held in the Katarina Church in Stockholm, as a tribute to «our Norwegian brothers».
213
 In 
Chapter 2 it was mentioned that the Nordic Idea and Scandinavism was based on the idea that 
the Nordic countries shared a bond through their shared language, history and culture; in a 
sense they were brothers. The Swedish protests were clearly built upon the idea of a Nordic 
brotherhood, which itself built upon the Nordic Idea . This was made evident at the big protest 
meeting in Linköping on December 5. The meeting had been arranged by the local Swedish-
Norwegian Association in Linköping, and among the attendees were the President of the 
student union at Stockholm University College and a representation of Uppsala University, 
professor Per Ölof Ekelöf.
214
 On the day after the meeting in Linköping and at Katarina 
Church, a meeting was held at Gävle city council, held a meeting in the «...hope that it might 
be found possible to avert the continuing campaign against our Norwegian blood kin, which 
threatens their freedom, and thus our Nordic rule of law and culture».
215
  
It is clear that that the Swedish reactions were founded upon the Nordic Idea. But, this 
was hardly extraordinary keeping in mind the long relationship between the two countries. 
The fact that the Germans were losing ground in Europe and that the Swedish government had 
taken a stand against the violations, made it easier for the Swedish population to react in 
relation to any events in Norway. This change is evident when comparing the reaction in 
December 1943 to the complete lack of reaction when Norway was invaded in April 1940. 
The silence of the Swedish population’s in 1940was not due to hard feelings towards the 
Norwegians, but rather the Swedish government’s fear of a German invasion. Alf W. 
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Johansson argues that during the invasion of Norway, the Swedish government saw it as 
embarrassing that they did not to help their neighbour in the west, when they had helped 
Finland during its war with Russia.
216
 Gaudeamus had as early as May 1940 brought to mind 
Sweden’s responsibility to help its Norwegian neighbours in their battle for their freedom.217  
It has to be argued that the government did have an influence upon the reactions in the 
newspapers, as the protesters wanted the government to take firmer stand against the Berlin 
after Ribbentrop’s reply to the appeal. This is demonstrated by the statement that was made in 
Linköping that «we are willing to suffer the restrictions that might come if the trade relations 
are broken with Germany». The Swedish population press and population were waiting for 
the Swedish government to join the Allied side, and they were ready to face the consequences 
of such an action. That the daily newspapers were the media to report about these sentiments 
can demonstrate the importance of newspapers in distributing information and including a 
response. It is the newspaper’s duty to inform the population about events occurring at home 
and abroad, but the interpretation of this information is solely up to the reader. It can be 
argued that if it had not been for the newspapers or T.T., then the Swedish population would 
not have received any information about the conflict in Oslo; perhaps there would have been 
simply a rumour which could not have been acted upon unless verified by the government. It 
is interesting to note that the Swedish students were informed about the conflict in Oslo 
through T.T., clearly indicating that if not for the news agency not even the students would 
have knwon about the arrests.
218
 It is clear that the Norwegians noticed the importance of the 
Swedish press in inducing a strong reaction, because on December 8, NS member Dagfinn 
Gjessing, an NS-man, wanted to teach the Swedish press about the «law of war».
219
 Gjessing 
argued that since the Swedish population still lived in peace, they thought about the war in a 
peaceful manner, and never about the fact that other countries were in a different sitatuion. 
The Swedish press, Gjessing reasoned, helped to maintain this idea, which caused the 
Swedish population to react negatively when the German occupational force in Norway had to 
deal with the realities of war and force its will upon the Norwegian population. The fact that 
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Gjessing viewed Sweden as peaceful, demonstrates his lack of knowledge about the real 
sentiments of the Swedish people. 
In this subchapter it has been demonstrated that the daily newspapers reported about 
the reactions from the Swedish peoples. It was also argued that through the daily newspapers 
it is possible to argue that both the newspapers and the Swedish population had been 
influenced by the protest from the Swedish government. In the following subchapter it will be 
looked at the Swedish academics reactions.  
 
5.2.3 The Swedish academics reactions    
«A week we will never forget» was the headline in Gaudeamus’s December issue in 1943.220 
Gaudeamus was referring to the week in which the Swedish students had learned about the 
arrest of their Norwegian colleagues and their risk of being deported to Germany. The daily 
newspapers might not have had an impact on the Swedish students’ protest, but the daily 
newspapers were the medium where the Swedish population could read about the students 
protests.  
On December 2, Aftonbladet reported that to respond against the recent violations in 
Oslo, the students at Uppsala would march from the University Library towards Uppsala 
University On December 4.
221
 Further, it was mentioned that at the end of the demonstration, 
the President of the Student Union and the Rector of the university would hold speeches. 
After the event, Aftonbladet wrote that the Rector had proclaimed that it was not a time for 
hate, because there was already too much hatred in the world. It was however, a time to show 
the world that the Nordic countries stood together, and express that the Norwegian students’ 
were more than welcome to Sweden.
222
 The reactions from the students was strong, and for 
the first time since the beginning of the war, it included the professors and lecturers. It has not 
been possible to find any indication that the professors had supported the students’ protests in 
previous years. It has to be argued, however, that it was the magnitude of the conflict now 
occurring in Oslo, that made the professors want to support the students; as the Rector 
ofUppsala University put it, « the Norwegian students cause is our cause».
223
 The student 
union president had proclaimed that «No stone will be left unturned – the deportation to 
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Germany cannot happen».
224
 The demonstration in Uppsala clearly built upon the Nordic 
Idea, which was important for the Swedish students and academics. The prominence of the 
Nordic Idea was present in Gaudeamus, where it was stated that the reaction had not occurred 
because demagogy, but because it had felt natural and right to respond on the behalf of the 
Norwegian students.
225
 The usage of the word «natural» can be traced back to the natural 
bond which Scandinavism and the Nordic Idea perceived to exist between the Nordic 
countries, based on the common language, history and culture.    
The protests created by Lund University and Stockholm University College had also 
this aspect of the Nordic Idea. On December 2, approximately 700 to 800 students had 
attended a meeting at Lund University, where a resolution had been created. This resolution 
stated that drastic measures had to be taken to protect the relationship between Sweden and 
Norway, and by that working for the Nordic Idea.
226
 This indicates the importance the 
Swedish students placed on Sweden’s relationship to its neighbouring countries and the 
perception of the Nordic countries as brothers. As Lundagård put it «the newest German 
violation is not only an infringement towards Norway, Norwegian citizens and Norwegian 
culture, but a violation towards the Nordic countries».
227
 On December 3, a demonstration 
organised by the Stockholm University College attracted 3000 students. The demonstration in 
Stockholm had started at the premises of the university college, and ended up in front of the 
building of the Norwegian Legation. Here, the demonstration had ended after the crowd had 
sung the Norwegian and Swedish National Anthems, and a speech by the Secretary of the 
Norwegian Prime Minister in exile, Hans Christian Berg. The minister had stated that «on 
behalf of my countrymen I would like to direct a heartfelt thank you to the Swedish students, 
because of the support you have shown your Norwegian brothers, this have deeply moved 
us».
228
 The Prime Minister’s Secretary was not the only Norwegian to express gratitude 
towards the Swedish students, because on December 13 Dagens Nyheter could report that the 
Swedish students had received a telegram of gratitude from the Norwegian students in 
London.
229
 «It is not an utopian idea that we have to take a firm stand in today’s situation, but 
rather the reality ... the Swedish students have with the rector of Uppsala University showed 
that they have taken a stand, and I will like to present my gratitude to all of you, as well as the 
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entire Swedish population». Even students from other countries wanted to praise the Swedish 
students, and the International Council of Students in Britain stated that «We send our 
gratitude with the message that we have to stand together in the defence of a free university 
system and free research».
230
 From the United States the President of both the United States 
Student Association and the International Student Association proclaimed that «The students 
in the free world are deeply impressed by the protests that the Swedish students has achieved 
in relation to the arrests of the students and professors in Oslo».
231
  
The Swedish students were committed to the Nordic Idea and to protecting it from any 
threats from the outside world. This is demonstrated by the discussion that emerged at 
Uppsala University, in relation to the Danish and Norwegian students’ unwillingness to let the 
Finnish students attend the demonstration. The demonstrations in both Stockholm and 
Uppsala had the Norwegian, Swedish and Danish flags at the front of the procession. The 
reason for the absence of the Finnish flag, at least in Uppsala, due to the fact that Finland was 
fighting on Germany’s side of the war. This created a conflict between the Finnish students 
and the students from Norway and Denmark, and the animosity between them caused quite a 
stir at the Nordiska Utskottet (the Nordic Association) in Uppsala. The Association reasoned 
that this attitude from the Norwegian students came not from their own personal beliefs, but 
had been forced upon them by the Norwegian Legation in Stockholm. The members of the 
Association were clearly avid promoters of the Nordic Idea, because at a meeting the 
Norwegian students’ views of the Finnish students were labelled frightening. This 
demonstrates that the Swedish students were so eager to promote for the Nordic idea that they 
were unable to understand the conflict the Norwegian students saw between remaining loyal 
to the Norwegian exile government and cooperating with the Finnish students towards a new 
future.  It was argued that it was the Swedish students’ duty to be neutral and to bring the 
other countries together. The solution presented by Utskottet was to send a delegation to the 
Legation to let the officials know their point of view.
232
 It has not been possible to  discover 
whether the students did actually send this delegation to the Legation, but considering that 
they even approached Prime Minister Hansson to have him to take a stand in the matter it is 
highly likely that they actually sent a delegation to the Legation.  
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The reaction to the arrests was a way for the Swedish population to show solidarity 
with the Norwegian students and professors. The result of the protest was a Swedish attempt 
to break all cultural connections with the Germans.   
In this subchapter it has been demonstrated that the reactions from the Swedish 
academics was the strongest reaction from the Swedish population. The demonstrations that 
were set up at the universities attracted hundreds of students. Below it will be looked at the 
consequence of these reactions.  
 
5.3 The consequence- the cancellation of the Swedish-German cultural 
relations  
«We hope to see a result» Gustaf Liden argued in Ergo in December 1943.
233
 Liden was 
mainly referring to the protest that the Swedish government had sent to Berlin, but it is 
possible that he also meant the students’ resolution to cancel the cultural connections with 
Germany.   
As early as December 2, GHT had an article that cited a statement from the Rector at 
Lund University; «The violations that we are reading about, is of such graveness that it is 
difficult to defend any future contact with German scientists».
234
 The day before, the Rector at 
Gothenburg University College had proclaimed that «Germany has directed a deathblow 
towards the scientific and cultural organisation of Norway. Protests is in this situation of little 
or no value. The only action that will be understood in Germany is a cancellation of all 
scientific and cultural connections with Germany».
235
 The notion was strong among the 
Swedish academics that the Germans by closing the University of Oslo had rendered any 
future cooperation with German academics impossible. This was demonstrated at Uppsala 
University, when students protested against that the Swedish-German Society at the university 
had invited the German scientist Albert Meyer-Abich to hold a lecture on the origin of life.
236
 
GHT stated on December 2, that an appeal had been sent to the society by several students, 
                                                 
233
 ”Vi hade velat se ett resultat”, Ergo, Volume Number 20, No.15, 11 December 1943.  
234
 ”Kontakt med tysk vetenskap hämmad för lång tid”, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning, Volume 
Number 112, No.279, 2 December 1943.  
235
 ”Bryt de kulturella förbindelserna med Tyskland!”, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning, No.278, 1 
December 1943.  
236
 ”Tysk i talarstolen i Uppsala”, Göteborgs Handels- och Sjöfartstidning, No.279, 2 December 1943.  
Albert Meyer-Abich was an supporter of the biological sciences. Primarily a philosophical proponent of holistic 
thought in biology. During the rule of Adolf Hitler he both supported the regime and opposed it. Cited by Olivier 
Rieppel, MIT Press Journal, Biological Theory, MIT Press Journal, 11. May 2011, 
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/biot.2008.3.4.357?journalCode=biot (19.04.2012).   
 78 
 
urging them to postpone the lecture because it would feel like «a smack in the face for the 
Norwegian students at the university», and no less for the Swedish students, that a German 
should lecture in Uppsala when his countrymen were destroying the foremost institution of 
higher education in the neighbouring country.
237
 The answer from the society was that they 
regretted the recent events occurring in Norway, but that this did not hinder the society from 
welcoming the scientist, because as the president of the society argued «our society does not 
deal with any form of politics (...) we have as a goal to spread knowledge about the culture of 
the German speaking countries».
238
 The consequence of the society’s unwillingness to 
postpone the lecture was that approximately one hundred students demonstrated outside of the 
location where the lecture was held. The demonstrators sang two songs, the Norwegian and 
Swedish national anthems, and gave a cheer to «our Norwegian friends and the freedom of the 
Nordic universities».
239
 Why was it this important for the Swedish academics and students to 
demonstrate for the Germans that the actions in Norway were unacceptable? 
It can be reasoned that the academics built their wish to show the Germans the 
unacceptability of their actions both on the Nordic Idea and the principle of free universities 
and research. As has been argued both in this chapter and previous chapters, the students had 
reacted to the violations at the University of Oslo on the grounds that the Nordic countries 
sharing a common language, history and culture. This meant that by attacking the University 
of Oslo the Germans were not only violating the freedom of the Norwegian academics;  they 
were also attacking the Swedish academics and students because of their association through 
the Nordic Idea. In the eyes of the Swedish academics and students, this made any future 
cooperation between Germany and Sweden impossible. In GHT it was reported that the 
Gothenburg School Association had stated «We hope that any Swedish citizen will cut any 
link they have with the German citizens to a minimum, for as long as the Nazi regime 
lasts».
240
 This demonstrates how important it was for the Swedes to show the Germans their 
indignation over what had taken place in Oslo on November 30, 1943. The insistence upon a 
cancellation of all connections with Germany is interesting, because the Swedish population 
had been heavily influenced by Germany both culturally and scientifically since the beginning 
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of the 1800s. Cutting all cultural connections with Germany was therefore a bold move for the 
Swedish.  
On December 16, the Rector at Uppsala University stated that the Swedish-German 
cultural exchanges had now been cancelled. The Student Union President at Uppsala 
elaborated, saying that «The opponents of these ideals (the freedom of research and a free 
university) is our common enemy, and our patience with a regime that preaches tyranny and 
intolerance has reached its limit» and he concluded «The representatives of these ideals are no 
longer welcome in our country».
241
 On December 15, GHT and Arbetet had reported that 
there had been hectic activity at several universities and university colleges concerning the 
possible severing of cultural and scientific connections with Germany. GHT stated that 
discussions had already been held at Uppsala University, and that meetings had been 
scheduled at Lund University and Stockholm University College. The meeting at Lund 
University created the basis for the Lund reaction, and the meeting in Stockholm defined how 
the institution would cancel its connections with Germany.
242
  In Gothenburg the Rector of 
the university college had stated that this reaction had not appeared as a concerted idea 
between the institutions, but rather as individual ideas at each university and university 
college.
243
 It is clear that it was important for the Swedish academics to show its support to its 
Norwegian colleagues, as well as demonstrating to its German colleagues that such behaviour 
was unacceptable. Yet, while many argued for a cancellation of the Swedish-German 
relations, others were protesting against this decision.  
On December 17, GHT reported that the Nazi students at Stockholm University 
College had held a meeting the day before, protesting against the cancellation of the Swedish-
German connections. The newspaper reported that «several of the Nazi students had 
emphasized upon the influence Germany had on Swedish research».
244
 One of the technology 
students had argued that 50 percent of the textbooks used in their studies were from Germany, 
and only 20 percent were Swedish. A student from the Veterinary University College had 
argued that 90 percent of the textbooks used were either from German or of German origin. 
That some students and academics were not pleased with the cancellation of the Swedish-
German relations was made apparent in Ergo. The student paper had taken time to question 
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several students and teachers whether they felt the cancellation to be justified or if it would be 
the downfall of Swedish research.
245
  
Associate Professor Carl-Martin Edsman argued that «A boycott of German science 
and its representatives is partly impossible, and to the extent that it can be realised is 
something that should not occur», because, he continued «we will then embrace the retaliation 
politics that we our selves detest».
246
 For the student Bertil Lauritzen a cancellation of the 
Swedish-German cultural connections meant that the Swedish population would not be able to 
watch German movies, because as he stated «we criticised in the mid-30s the Germans import 
prohibition of American and British movies. Are we to do the same now?». Another student, 
Anders Lidström argued that the cancellation would affect the old German intelligentsia, that 
had for years fought a silent battle for freedom of speech and research within the German 
borders. Sanctions, Lindström argued would isolate them even further.
247
 The ideas behind 
these arguments was that the Swedish academics should not lower themselves to the same 
levels as the German occupational force had done in Norway. If the Swedish academics did 
that, how then could they speak of the freedom of research and a free university. The 
argument went that even if the German occupational force in Norway did not respect the 
freedom of research, did not mean that every academic and artist had the same belief. In Lund 
it was stated by the three pro-German professors, Gottfrid Carlsson, Erik Rooth and Hugo 
Odeberg that «the impact of the cancellations can be severe, to such an extent that it would be 
difficult to restore the relations».
248
 Notary Erik Anners at Uppsala University, however, 
defended, on the other hand the decision of terminating the Swedish-German relations by 
arguing that «to cancel the relations is the only political weapon the Swedish academics have 
to collectively show our colleagues in Denmark and Norway the extent of our resentment 
towards the occupational force’s violations». Politics can be defined as a process where a 
group of people makes collective decision. In their position as the country’s intelligentsia the 
Swedish academics had the opportunity to make statements that would not go unnoticed in 
governmental offices, because even though they had no power over the government, they 
were the ones who were forming the future leaders, poets, artists and writers of the Swedish 
society.  
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In this subchapter it has been demonstrated that after the events in Oslo, the Swedish 
academics cancelled all cultural and scientific contact with Germany. This was well received 
by the majority of the Swedish students, but some argued that the cancellation would harm 
Sweden. The cancellation was an expression of the respect that the Swedish academics had 
for its Norwegian colleagues.  
 
5.4 Summary 
The Swedish reactions to the closure of the University of Oslo and the immediate arrests of its 
students and professors were extensive. 
The Swedish government’s protest was well received by the Swedish population and 
the Norwegian exile government, and the hope was that the Swedish government would 
finally join the Allied war effort. Ribbentrop’s reply, however, made the Prime Minister state 
that no measures would be taken against Germany. The Prime Minister was afraid of the 
consequences if the Swedish government should act against the will of Berlin. In his opinion 
this would lead to nothing. Yet, there were some within the Swedish government that thought 
that it was time for the government to change its course, because on December 17 a reply to 
Ribbentrop’s answer was published. It was the opinion of the newspapers that this reply had 
come from the government, and historians have supported this claim. Yet, since the Swedish 
government did not verify this claim, one can only speculate about who published the reply, 
though the assumption is that Eriksson, Wigforss and Möller might have published it, because 
of their opposition to the Prime Minister’s and Foreign Minister’s pragmatic neutrality. 
The Norwegians in London felt that the Swedish government had showed its 
ambiguity by not taking any measures against the Germans. The Norwegians were, however, 
pleased with the Swedish students and the rest of the reactions of the general Swedish 
population. In subchapter 5.2.2 it was stated that the daily newspaper was the medium through 
which the population’s protests were spread to the rest of the population. The largest protest 
that occurred besides from the students’ protest, was the meeting in Linköping on December 
5, which drew 12.000 attendees. It is difficult to know whether these reactions had been 
influenced chiefly by the daily newspapers coverage of the arrests, or the government’s 
protest, but it can be stated that without T.T and the daily newspapers the majority of the 
Swedish population would not have been informed of the government’s protest. The big 
difference between the reactions of the daily newspapers and the student newspapers to the 
events of November 30, 1943, was that the student newspapers were concerned mostly with 
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their own protest and the government’s, whereas the daily newspapers reported on a broader 
scale of the many Swedish reactions and protests.  
The reactions and protests of the Swedish students and academics were perhaps the 
most powerful responses violations at the University of Oslo, and was not influenced by the 
government’s politics. Their reactions and protests were founded upon the idea that the 
Germans had violated their «brothers» freedom to study and do research undisturbed. It is 
interesting that the Swedish professors supported their students’ reactions in December 1943. 
This support was of great consequence, as on December 16, it was stated that Uppsala 
University had cancelled their cultural connections with Germany. This was something that 
would be followed up by Lund University and Stockholm University College. This decision 
was ill received by some at the three institutions used in this discussion. Their main argument 
was that the cancellation of the relations would be so devastating that it would be impossible 
to restore them after the war. The general reaction to the cancellation was positive, however, 
as was argued that a cancellation was the only way that the Swedish academics could show 
support with their Norwegian colleagues.  
The Nordic Idea was either openly used or and underlying factor in all of the reactions 
mentioned in this chapter. In subchapter 5.2.2 it was argued that the meetings in Linköping, 
Gävle and the Katarina Church had used the words «brother», «brotherhood» or «bloodkin» 
to explain their reactions. In Gaudeamus the word «natural» was used to explain the students’ 
instinctive reaction upon learning about the events in Norway. The debate that occurred at the 
student union of Uppsala University concerning the Norwegian students’ unwillingness to 
allow the Finnish flag be in the demonstration parade, indicates to the extent to which the 
students in Uppsala were willing to go in order to protect the Nordic Idea.   
The differences between the student newspapers and the daily newspapers are not too 
clear in this chapter, because they both commented on the event in Oslo. The daily 
newspapers coverage of the Swedish reactions was more extensive than the student 
newspapers’ coverage. Still, the students demonstrations and protests was arguably more 
widespread than the daily newspaper’s coverage, since the students did end all cultural 
connection with Germany.  
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Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter will sum up the reactions from the student papers and daily newspapers under the 
two main questions «How did the student newspapers and daily newspapers react?» and 
«Why did the student newspapers and daily newspapers react?». It has to be kept in mind that 
some of the answers given to on question will also apply to the other. Then finally, a few 
concluding remarks will be made.  
 
6.1 How did the student newspapers and daily newspapers react? 
The student newspapers  
In September 1940 the Swedish students reacted with disbelief when Det Norske 
Studentersamfund (DNS) was dissolved and its president being arrested. In Gaudeamus it was 
argued that «The Norwegian students, who we see as our close friends and colleagues, have 
been discriminated against, because of their decision to protect Norway’s political and 
cultural independence». All three of the student papers used in this thesis believed it to be NS 
that had dissolved the union and not the Germans.  
In September 1941 in relation to the arrest of Rector Didrik Arup Seip the reactions 
from the three student papers differed. Ergo had an article where it was mentioned that it had 
been the Germans that had made the arrest of the rector. In Ergo, Ingemar Hedenius was 
shocked that the German academics allowed this to happen to their colleagues in Norway. 
Gaudeamus was hindered by its own Student Union from making a comment since the union 
feared that a statement would be misinterpreted. This meant that the student newspaper did 
not make a comment before six months after the actual arrest. The article that was published 
in Lundagård in January 1942 was seemed as pro-German by the student population at Lund. 
The discussion concerning this article was not on whether the article was pro-German or not, 
but whether the editorial board that published the article was pro-German or not. It was 
concluded that the editorial board was not pro-German, but that this was a rumour set out by 
the opposition to the editorial board. The publishing of the article had been a streak of bad 
judgment during the editing of the initial article.  
In May 1942 a letter of protest was created by five of the largest educational 
institutions in Sweden, in relation to NS’s violations of the Norwegian teachers and clergy. «It 
is with great concern and indignation that we see how the regime in Norway, which is lacking 
any form of resonance with the Norwegian population, is step by step, destroying the basic 
values that have made the Nordic countries nations of culture» stated one part of the protest.  
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That the student papers did not comment upon the Norwegian students protest in 
February 1943 was in Chapter 4 argued to be out of the ordinary, when keeping in mind that 
the students had made a statement in September 1940, September 1941 and May 1942. It was 
not possible to conclude upon why the student papers had not commented upon this event. In 
relation to the students silence to the Norwegian professors’ protest in September 1943 it was 
argued that this was caused by the influx of Danish students in Sweden.  
The reactions from the student papers in relation to the closure of the University of 
Oslo in November 1943 were extensive. The three educational institutions had meetings and 
held demonstrations in support of the Norwegian students and professors. It was for example 
argued that «the Norwegian students cause is our cause», and «No stone will be left unturned 
– the deportation to Germany cannot happen». In December 1943 the three educational 
institutions ended all cultural and scientific connection with Germany. It was argued that «We 
hope that any Swedish citizen will cut any link they have with the German citizens to a 
minimum, for as long as the Nazi regime lasts». This was not well received by several at 
Uppsala University, because as it was argued «we will then embrace the retaliation politics 
that we our selves detest».  
 
The daily newspapers.  
The daily newspapers did not mention the dissolution of DNS, but in September 1941 the 
newspapers commented on the arrest of Rector Seip. It was argued in Chapter 3 that the 
reason for this was that by September 1941 the Swedish population had become aware of 
these travesties the Norwegian population was experiencing under the new regime. The pro-
Norwegian opposition emerged independently to the daily newspapers articles, but it was 
argued that since the newspapers wrote about the arrest of Rector Seip, they were helping to 
enhance the importance of the opposition. 
In Chapter 4 it was demonstrated that when the Swedish students did not comment 
upon events at the University of Oslo, the daily newspapers did. All three papers commented 
upon the events in February 1943, and it was argued that this was because of the pro-
Norwegian opposition’s wish to make the Swedish government become aware of the 
violations in Norway and through this, stop the transportation of German soldiers. In 
September 1943 Dagens Nyheter was the only newspaper that commented upon the events in 
Oslo, and it was of interest that the newspaper linked the protest with the conflict within NS.  
When the University of Oslo was closed on November 30, 1943, the daily newspapers 
commented on every event that took place in Sweden; especially the appeal from the Swedish 
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government. In connection with the Swedish government’s appeal, the daily newspapers 
commented on the reactions from the Norwegian exile government. One statement from the 
Norwegian exile government was «what has now occurred only shows that the feeling of 
Nordic solidarity and spiritual friendship is still present amongst the Nordic countries». 
 
Differences and similarities.  
From the findings in this thesis it is clear that compared with the student newspapers, the daily 
newspapers had the broadest coverage of the events at the University of Oslo, with only one 
event in which they did not report upon. Yet, it has to be argued that the student newspapers 
coverage of the events in Oslo showed a greater understanding of what had occurred. This had 
a lot to do with the Nordic Idea.  
It has been possible to see a difference within the student newspapers in relation to 
how strong their reactions were to the events taking place in Oslo. Ergo always had strong 
articles in relation to the dissolution of Rector Seip, as well as the dissolution of DNS. Even 
though the newspaper had a short break during the Norwegian students and professors 
protests in February and September 1943, Ergo and Uppsala continued its strong reactions in 
December 1943. It is possible to speak of Ergo perhaps being less conservative than the 
university it was to represent. Gaudeamus lived up to its reputation of being liberal. 
Lundagård did comment on every event that took place in Oslo, except from the protests in 
February and September 1943. Yet, the differences from the other two student newspapers, 
was that the article in January 1942 would damage Lundagård’s reputation.  
Amongst the daily newspapers one can rather speak of similarities in how they 
reacted. The articles about the events in Oslo were in many cases short,  but detailed. This 
could have had something to do with both the pro-Norwegian opposition as well as the 
Swedish government.  
 
6.2 Why did the student papers and daily newspapers react? 
The Nordic Idea 
The main reason for why the Swedish student newspapers reacted to the events in Oslo had a 
lot to do with the old traditions within the student population to cooperate through the Nordic 
Idea. In September 1940 and September 1941 the Nordic Idea was present in Gaudeamus in 
the argument «of their decision to protect Norway’s political and cultural independence». It 
seems as it was important for the Swedish students that the Norwegian cultural independence 
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was not threatened, because if it was, then it meant that the Swedish culture was under threat 
as well. As Eva Wennerström-Hartmann argued in Ergo «No one can argue that the events do 
not concern us». 
In September 1941 Ingemar Hedenius argued in Ergo that the Swedish students had 
not been able to help its «brother» in need. This had a clear references to the use of the word 
brother in the Nordic Idea when relating to the neighbouring countries. The article in 
Lundagård was initially based upon a support of the rector through the Nordic Idea, but 
because of several amendments it came out as supportive towards why the arrests had 
happened. This was as already argued a streak of bad judgment during editing. In Stockholm, 
Gaudeamus was hindered by the student union, because it was feared that a protest based on 
the Nordic Idea would be misinterpreted by  
As mentioned above the daily newspapers did not comment upon events at the 
university before September 1941, and then it had clear links to the pro-Norwegian opposition 
that emerged in Sweden with the state of emergency in Oslo. This idea was founded on the 
ideas of the Nordic Idea.  
In May 1942 the protest by the Swedish students was well received by the daily 
newspapers, and it was argued by Dagens Nyheter that «Now that trade unionists, teachers, 
priests and academics are on the same page, the circle is closed with strong Swedish iron». 
The students were however not pleased with the daily newspapers coverage of the protest, 
because T.T had left an important part of the protest where the students had stated that 
«Especially, we will as students direct a protest towards the dissolution of the cultural life in 
Norway». It can be argued that this was indication that the students felt that through violating 
the Norwegian society, NS was violating the Swedish society as well.  
Interestingly, the Swedish students did not mention the Norwegian students protest in 
February 1943 or the protest from the Norwegian professors in September 1943. Where was 
the Nordic Idea then? It was not possible to conclude on why the students did not comment on 
the protest in February, but in relation to the protest in September, it was possible to conclude 
that the Swedish students were too occupied with supporting the Danish students.  
The daily newspapers coverage of the Norwegian students and professors protests in 
February 1943 and September 1943 demonstrated that the pro-Norwegian thought was still 
present in their coverage of events at the university.  
When the University of Oslo was closed on November 30, 1943, the Swedish students 
were the first to demonstrate their support of the Norwegian students and professors. 
Lundagård argued this «the newest German violation is not only an infringement towards 
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Norway, Norwegian citizens and Norwegian culture, but a violation towards the Nordic 
countries». Another way the Swedish students supported its Norwegian colleagues was 
through the cancellation of the cultural connections with Germany. Notary Erik Anners at 
Uppsala University argued that «to cancel the relations is the only political weapon the 
Swedish academics have to collectively show our colleagues in Denmark and Norway the 
extent of our resentment towards the occupational force’s violations». 
Was the Nordic Idea present in the daily newspapers? As already argued the daily 
newspapers reported any protest and demonstration that took place in the days after the arrests 
of the Norwegian students and professors. What the daily newspapers emphasised on when 
writing about the demonstrations can give an indication about what they thought about the 
arrests themselves. Arbetet reported that the Swedish Authors Association had stated that the 
arrests were a «decapitation of the Norwegian people». Dagens Nyheter could report that 
Gävle city council had held a meeting in the «...hope that it might be found possible to avert 
the continuing campaign against our Norwegian blood kin, which threatens their freedom, and 
thus our Nordic rule of law and culture». 
 
The Swedish government’s relations with the German government and the Norwegian 
exile government.  
Did the Swedish government’s relations with the German government and the Norwegian 
influence the reactions from the student newspapers and the daily newspapers?  
The reaction from the student papers in September 1940 was influenced by the 
government’s fear of a German invasion. This manifested itself in the student newspapers 
mentioning NS as the reason why DNS was dissolved. Whether these relations dominated the 
reactions from the student newspapers in September 1941 is difficult to say. Hedenius in Ergo 
was clear that he viewed the German occupational force to have made the arrest of Rector 
Seip, whereas the student union in Stockholm was afraid that a protest would be 
misinterpreted. Who the student union believed could misinterpret the protest was not 
specified, but it was argued that it might have been the Germans. The article in Lundagård 
was influenced by Oscar Bjurling’s wish to follow the Swedish government’s wish to not 
make foreign government’s question Sweden’s neutrality. The initial article had not been 
influenced by this at all.  
During these two events it seems as though the Swedish students were not influenced 
by the Swedish government’s plummeting relations with the Norwegian exile government. 
The relations between the two governments had started to worsen when the Swedish 
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government had allowed for Germany to transport soldiers on the Swedish railway system. It 
would decrease with the Norwegian ships in Gothenburg, and the unsolved question of 
diplomatic representation through an envoy. That the Norwegian exile government would 
cancel its connections with the Finnish government did not make matters any better.   
In May 1942 the Swedish students protested against the conflict between NS and the 
Norwegian clergy and teachers. This protest was not influenced by the relations the Swedish 
government had with the two governments. It was rather a protest based upon facts about who 
had violated the rights of the clergy and teachers. That the protest was not influenced by the 
Swedish government’s relation with the Norwegian exile government can be demonstrated by 
the fact that by 1942 the relations between the two governments were at a standstill. The daily 
newspapers also showed that they were not on terms of what the Swedish government wanted 
to be printed. A sentence from Dagens Nyheter can give an indication of what the newspapers 
felt «Now that trade unionists, teachers, priests and academics are on the same page, the circle 
is closed with strong Swedish iron». 
Was the Swedish students influenced by these relations in February 1943 and 
September 1943? This has been difficult to conclude upon, but when keeping in mind that the 
relations between the Norwegian exile government and the Swedish government had started 
to thaw in February and was quite good in September, it is not possible that the students 
reacted because this connection was bad. It is as well not possible to argue that the students 
were influenced by a threat from Berlin, since the Swedish government had since the 
beginning of 1943 started to show a stricter attitude towards this government. That the daily 
newspapers were direct when commenting on these two protests demonstrates even further 
that the Swedish government had started to relax in terms of what and what was not allowed 
to be printed in newspapers.   
In December 1943 the students and the daily newspapers were not influenced by any 
connection the government had with the other two governments. It became a question of 
supporting the Norwegian academics than to follow any policies from the Swedish 
government. It is interesting to note that even the government’s own protest was influenced 
by its own connection with the German government. The Swedish Prime Minister had no 
wish to take out any measures against Berlin after Ribbentrop’s answer to the Swedish 
Foreign Minister’s appeal. Still, an answer was given Ribbentrop, but it was not possible to 
conclude upon who had done this. It was argued that it might have been Minister of Finance 
Ernst Wigforrs, the Minister of Trade Herman Eriksson and the Social Minister Gustav 
Möller. 
 89 
 
It is evident that in relation to the Swedish government’s wishes during the war 
collided with the opinion of the Swedish population.  
 
Differences and similarities? 
The similarities between the student papers and daily newspapers in relation to the Nordic 
Idea was that they reacted because of a feeling of solidarity with the Norwegians, which was 
manifested through the Nordic Idea and the pro-Norwegian opposition. The differences were 
how the use of the idea manifested itself in the two groups of newspapers. In the student 
papers it was in many cases clear that it was argued from a Nordic Idea point of view, but 
with the daily newspapers the discourse analysis has been used to find these answers.  
The Swedish government’s relations with the German government and the Norwegian 
exile government influenced both the student newspapers and the daily newspapers, but in 
different ways. In the early war years, the student newspaper were more inclined to follow the 
government’s encouragement to not criticise foreign country’s warfare. That it was seen as 
not dangerous to criticise NS in Norway was probably why the student newspaper blamed NS 
during the dissolution of DNS in September 1940. During 1942 this changed, and the student 
newspapers started to be more bold in their statements. This was demonstrated with the strong 
protest in May 1942. The daily newspapers were stopped by the restrictions from the Swedish 
government, but it did not halter them completely, because compared to the student 
newspapers the daily newspapers were not afraid to mention the German occupational force in 
their articles.  
  
6.3 Concluding remarks.  
All things considered, the reactions from the Swedish student newspapers and daily 
newspapers to the events at the University of Oslo were sometimes strong, sometimes less so. 
The political beliefs and leanings of the student newspapers and daily newspapers did play a 
crucial role in how they reacted. This had a lot to do with the influence both by the Nordic 
Idea and the Swedish government’s relations with Berlin and the Norwegian exile 
government. The conclusion is that in relation to the Swedish government it became a 
question of the Swedish society’s wishes and the government’s. The idea of Norway being the 
«brother» country became in many cases more important than to follow the Swedish 
government’s encouragement to not make foreign countries question Sweden’s neutrality. 
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This became evident in December 1943 when the Swedish academics cancelled their cultural 
connections with Germany. 
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